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COMMENT

Catron County Board of
Commissioners, N.M. v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Service: Is Functional
Equivalence the Solution to the
Emerging Critical Habitat Problem?
INTRODUCTION
The agencies that administer this country's environmental and
natural resources laws shoulder a heavy load. The sheer number of laws for
which they bear administrative responsibility is daunting. Even more
daunting, though, is the actual business of administration, because it
involves a delicate balancing of biological considerations, statutory interpretation, and public relations. If an agency makes a questionable decision,
it will almost certainly be questioned. As a result, agencies such as the
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Fish and Wildlife
Service are constantly made to answer for their decisions, both to the courts
and to the public. Undoubtedly that sort of scrutiny helps ensure the
protection of the environment. For the agencies, however, it makes administration more difficult, and can bring the process to a near standstill.
For the agency primarily responsible, the administration of one
environmental law- the Endangered Species Act1 (ESA) - recently became
more difficult. In the wake of Catron Count Board of Commissioners, New
Mexico v. United States Fish & Wildlyf Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) must perform the time-consuming procedures of the National
Environmental Policy Acte (NEPA) before extending complete protection to
species it determines are in danger of extinction. Specifically, the issue in
Catron County was whether the FWS would be required to undertake
NEPA's procedures before designating critical habitat4 for two threatened

1. 16 U.S.C. fS 1531-44 (1994).
2. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1994).
4. "Critical habitat" is:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by a species, at
the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of (the
ESAJ, on which are found those physical or biological features () essential
to the conservation of the species and (I1)which may require special
management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the
geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed ... upon
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fish, the loach minnow (Tiaroga cobitis) and the spikedace (Medafulgida).5
The Tenth Circuit concluded that it would.6
The Tenth Circuit's decision has a certain, simplistic appeal. The
language of NEPA, after all, seems to admit of no exceptions -"all agencies
...
shall" perform NEPA's procedures.7 There are, however, several theories
on which courts have granted agencies exemptions from NEPA,
notwithstanding the statute's imperative language. One such theoryfunctional equivalence -would have been, had the court chosen to employ
it, particularly relevant to the issue in Catron County. Essentially, functional
equivalence theory says that a court may exempt an agency from strictly
fulfilling NEPA's requirements when, in pursuance of its administrative
duties, the agency performs procedures equivalent to those of NEPA. The
underlying logic of functional equivalence theory is obvious. It is highly
inefficient to require an agency to prepare a study that is duplicative of
work the agency has already completed; that is, to require it to "stop in the
middle of its proceedings in order to issue a separate and distinct impact
"'
statement just to be issuing it.
An examination of the ESA's critical habitat designation procedures
clearly demonstrates their suitability for a functional equivalence
exemption. The ESA requires the FWS, before designating critical habitat,
to do the same sort of environmental assessment NEPA requires.9 Also, like
NEPA, the ESA requires the FWS to seek public input into its decisions."
Despite its obvious relevance to the issue in CatronCounty, however, functional equivalence theory appears only indirectly in the court's analysis."
Arguably, the court's failure to analyze the issue within the functional
equivalence framework weakens its decision.

a determination... that such areas are essential for the conservation of the
species.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (1994).
5. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, 75 F.3d at 1433.
6. Id. at 1439. Faced with the same issue, the Ninth Circuit, in a case decided one year
before Catron County, reached the opposite conclusion. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d
1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994) (emphasis added).
8. Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66,71-72 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906
(1976) (holding that a study undertaken by the Environmental Protection Agency prior to
suspending the registrations of three chemical toxicants was functionally equivalent to an
environmental impact statement).
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
10. Id. at § 1533(b)(5) (1994).
11. CatronCounty Bd. ofComm'rs, 75 F.3d 1429,1435-36 (stating that courts have excused
agencies from NEPA compliance "where the particular action being undertaken is subject
to rules and regulations that essentially duplicate the NEPA inquiry,' and citing cases in
support).
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This Comment focuses on NEPA functional equivalence theory, its
relevance to the issue of critical habitat designation, and the Tenth Circuit's
failure to address it in CatronCounty. In order to help lay the groundwork,
Part I discusses the ESA's procedures for protecting species and their
habitats. Part II then looks at the application of those procedures to the
protection of the loach minnow and the spikedace. Catron County's challenge to the FWS grew out of an interesting political milieu, which is the
focus of Part III. Part W outlines the procedural history of the case, with an
emphasis on the parties' presentation of the various theories of NEPA
exemption, induding functional equivalence. Part V traces the history of the
three theories of NEPA exemption, in order to put the question of
exemption into proper historical context. Finally, Part VI argues for exemption of critical habitat designation from the requirements of NEPA. It
suggests that there are two formulations of functional equivalence theory,
either of which supports exemption in this case. The purpose of this
Comment is not simply to criticize the decision in Catron County. Rather, it

is to suggest, as does functional equivalence analysis itself, that a court
should not interpret a statute formalistically, at the expense of furthering
the statute's goals and objectives.
I. LISTING PROCEDURES OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The ESA provides the statutory framework through which
threatened 12 and endangered13 species and their habitats? receive federal
protection. When Congress enacted the ESA in 1973, it stated that its intent
was "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
and threatened species depend may be conserved," and "to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened
species." 5 It delegated to the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce
(Secretary), who act through the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), respectively," the responsibility of administering the

12. A threatened species is one "which is likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. §

1532(20) (1994).
13. An endangered species is one "which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994).
14. For a definition of critical habitat, see supra note 4.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
16. U.S. FISH AND WDLiE SERvlcE, ENDANGmED SPECIES INFORMATION HANDBOOK Tab
I at 4 (1995) [hereinafter ESA HANDBOOK]. As one might expect, the NMFS is primarily
responsible for decisions involving marine plant and animal species and anadromous fish
(i.e., fish that live in the oceans but spawn in fresh water), while the FWS is generally
responsible for terrestrial plant and animal species and fresh water fish. Id.
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ESA.17 By late 1996, the FWS and the NMFS, in pursuance of the purposes
of the ESA, had either already extended protection to, or were considering
protecting, more than 1,100 plant and animal species.'
Despite its importance, protection of threatened and endangered
species does not necessarily come quickly. The FWS and the NMFS may not
simply declare a species to be threatened or endangered and extend to it
whatever protection they deem appropriate. Instead, they must follow the
steps of what is commonly known as "the listing process," as outlined in
section 4 of the ESA.19 The first step in the listing process is the Secretary's
determination that a species is either threatened or endangered. It begins
when an interested person files an appropriate written petition with the
Secretary," or when the Secretary concludes that habitat modification, or
predation, or disease, or some other factor, is jeopardizing the continued
existence of a species.2' The Secretary is to base final listing decisions on the
"best scientific and commercial data available;" n but may choose to defer
to the protection offered by the State or States in which the species is found
if he believes that protection is adequate."
Section 4 of the ESA likewise governs the procedures for the designation of critical habitat,24 which, although similar, differ from the listing
procedures in some important respects. Interested persons may petition the
Secretary to change a designated critical habitat,' just as they may to
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994).
18. ESA HANtnooK, supra note 16, at Tab 2 (Sept. 1996 update). Specifically, the two
agencies had, as of September 30,1996, listed 961 species as threatened or endangered, and
had begun the process of listing 232 other species. Id.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)-(C) (1994); Listing Endangered and Threatened Species
and Designating Critical Habitat, 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 (1997) [hereinafter Listing Regulations).
A proper petition is one that:
(i) Clearly indicates the administrative measure recommended and gives
the scientific and any common name of the species involved; (ii) Contains
detailed narrative justification for the recommended measure, describing,
based on available information, past and present numbers and distribution
of the species involved and any threats faced by the species; (iii) Provides
information regarding the status of the species over all or a significant
portion of its range; and (iv) Is accompanied by appropriate supporting
documentation in the form of bibliographic references, reprints of pertinent
publications, copies of reports or letters from authorities, and maps.
Id. at § 424.14(b)(2)(i)-(iv).

21. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1994).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1994).
23. Id. (The Secretary shall make determinations... after taking into account those
efforts, if any, being made by any State... to protect such species, whether by predator
control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other conservation practices ...
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(D) (1994); Listing Regulations, supra note 20, at § 424.14(c).
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initiate the listing process.' Furthermore, the Secretary is to designate critical habitat "on the basis of the best scientific data available," ' much the
same as with listing decisions.' In addition, however, and in contrast to the
listing process, the Secretary must also consider possible impacts, economic
or otherwise, of proposed critical habitat designations.' She must weigh the
burdens to the area of proposed designation against the benefits of designation to the species." The ESA and its implementing regulations define
only cursorily the sort of weighing the Secretary must do, but they permit
her to exclude areas from designation when she believes that the burdens
of designation outweigh the benefits?' Finally, because critical habitat is, by
definition, "essential to the conservation of [a] species," 32 it is to be designated concurrently with listing, "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable."I The Secretary may grant a one year extension for critical habitat
designation, after which a final designation is necessary.' Despite the importance of critical habitat and the mandatory time limit for its designation,
however, the Secretary often falls short in her duty to make designations.'
The development and implementation of "recovery plans" is
another important component of ESA protection. Recovery plans are, as the
name implies, essentially outlines of the steps the FWS or the NMFS will
take to help ensure the survival of a listed species.' They may be thought
of as tools to aid in "the conservation and survival of endangered species
26. See supra note 20, and accompanying text.
27. '16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994); Listing Regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (1997).
28. See supra note 22, and accompanying text.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994) (The Secretary shall designate critical habitat... after
taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying
any particular area as critical habitat.").
30. Id.
31. The Secretary shall identify any significant activities that would either affect an area
considered for designation as critical habitat or be likely to be affected by the designation
...[and] may exclude any portion of such an area from the critical habitat if the benefits of
such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying the area as part of the critical habitat. The
Secretary shall not exclude any such area if, based on the best scientific and commercial data
available, he determines that the failure to designate that area as critical habitat will result
in the extinction of the species concerned. Listing Regulations, supra note 20 at § 424.19

(1997); see also 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(2) (1994).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I) (1994).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1994). A designation is not "prudent" if it might lead to an
increase in human activity in the area, or would not benefit the species. Listing Regulations,
supra note 20 at § 424.12(a)(1) (1997). It is not adeterminable" if there is insufficient
information available for "required analyses," or the needs of the species are not sufficiently
well-known." Id. at § 424.12(a)(2).
34. Listing Regulations, supra note 20 at §424.17(b) (1997).
35. Less than 13% of the species listed have designated critical habitat. See ESA
HaNDBOOK, supra note 16, at Tab 2.

36. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994).
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and threatened species."" They must include site-specific management directives,' criteria defining when a species will no longer need protection,39
and estimates of the time and costs of effecting a species' recovery.' ° The
ESA directs the Secretary to give priority in the development and implementation of recovery plans to those species "that are most likely to benefit
from such plans, particularly those species that are, or may be, in conflict
with construction or other development projects or other forms of economic
activity."41
The Secretary must give the public notice of, and an opportunity to
comment on, decisions to list a species or to designate critical habitat.42 He
must publish notices of proposed actions in both the Federal Register and
appropriate local newspapers, and provide actual notice to those States
and their subdivisions in which the species occurs." Once he has given
notice, the Secretary must allow at least 60 days for public comment. 4
Furthermore, the Secretary must, if even a single person so requests, hold
a public hearing at which to discuss the proposal.* The procedures for the
promulgation of a final regulation are similar, the primary difference being
that the Secretary need not hold any public hearings.47
There is, of course, much more to the ESA than species listing and
its attendant procedures. However, listing is at the core of the ESA. More
importantly, it was the listing of two species found in Catron County that
gave rise to the controversy.
II.

ESA PROTECTION FOR THE LOACH MINNOW AND THE
SPIKEDACE

At the heart of the controversy in Catron County are two small,
threatened fish indigenous to the Gila River system of Arizona and New
Mexico - the loach minnow (Tiaroga cobitis) and the spikedace (Meda
fulgida). Had it not been for the resultant legal challenge, their listings

37. Id. at § 1533(f)(1).
38. Id. at $1533(f)(1)(B)(i).
39. Id. at § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii).
40. Id. at $1533(f)(1)(B)(iii).
41. Id. at § 1533(f)(1)(A).
42. Id. at § 1533(b)(5). The Secretary must also provide for notice and comment prior to
the adoption of a recovery plan. Id. at § 1533(0(4).
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(5)(A)(I), (b)(5)(D); Listing Regulations, supra note 20, at §§
424.16(c)(1)(i), (c)(1)(vi).
44. 16 U.S.C § 1533(b)(5)(A)(fi); Listing Regulations, supra note 20, at § 424.16(c)(1)(ii).
45. Listing Regulations, supra note 20, at § 424.16(c)(2).
46. 16 US.C. § 1533(b)(5)(E); Listing Regulations, supra note 20, at § 424.16(c)(3) ("The
Secretary shall promptly hold at least one public hearing if any person so requests ...
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6) (1994); Listing Regulations, supra note 20, at § 424.18.
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would have been unremarkable. This section discusses the listing histories
of the loach minnow and the spikedace, including a brief discussion of the
adoption of recovery plans for the two species. Special attention is paid to
the procedures the FWS followed in designating critical habitat, as it was
the designation of critical habitat that became the basis for Catron County's
legal challenge.
A.

Listing

In 1982, in its Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as
Endangered or Threatened Species,' the FWS included both the loach
minnow and the spikedace among the "Category 1" species." That meant
that the FWS had "substantial information on hand to support the biological
appropriateness of proposing to list the species as Endangered or
Threatened." ° It also meant, for those species designated as Category 1, that
"data [was] being gathered concerning the environmental impacts of
listings and the economic effects of the Critical Habitat designations," and
that "[dJevelpment and publication of proposed rules on such species [was]
anticipated." 1 In other words, protection of the loach minnow and the
spikedace was, in the opinion of the FWS, warranted, and the FWS was,
officially if not actively, taking steps to secure the necessary protection.
Nevertheless, listing was still nearly four years away.
In 1985, the FWS simultaneously published its listing proposals for
the loach minnow" and the spikedace s' in the Federal Register. The FWS
also published summaries of the proposals in the Prescott, Arizona,
Courier the Safford, Arizona, EasternArizona Courier,ss and the Silver City,
New Mexico, Daily Press.5 ' The FWS cited habitat destruction and the
introduction of competitive, exotic fish species as causes for declines in the
respective populations of the two fish. 7 It estimated that, at the time, the

48. 47 Fed. Reg. 58,454 (1982).
49. Id. at 58,456.
50. Id. at 58,454.
51. Id.
52. Proposal to Determine the Loach Minnow to be a Threatened Species and to
Determine its Critical Habitat, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,380 (1985) [hereinafter Loach Minnow Listing
Proposal).
53. Proposal to Determine the Spikedace to be a Threatened Species and to Determine
its Critical Habitat, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,390 (1985) [hereinafter Spikedace Listing Proposal].
54. PublicNotice, CouRIER (Prescott, Ariz.), July 5,1985, at 7B.
55. Public Notice, EAsrm ARuz. Courier (Safford, Ariz.), July 10,1985, at A20.
56. DAILY PRESS (Silver City, N.M.), July 2,1985, at 4B; July 13,1985, at 8.
57. See Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,381-82; Spikedace Listing
Proposal, supra note 53, at 25,391-92.
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loach minnow occupied only 15 percent of its historic range,'M while the
spikedace occupied only six percent of its historic range.59 As the ESA
requires, the FWS sought public input on the two proposals. It accepted
written comments for approximately 60 days following the publication of
the proposals.' It also accepted requests for public hearings for
approximately 45 days.'
The FWS received six requests for public hearings.' 2 In satisfaction
of the requests, the FWS scheduled three hearings for early October, 1985,
two of which were held in Arizona and one in New Mexico. 0 To
accommodate those who attended the public hearings, the FWS reopened
the comment period for an additional 30 days." In response to its
invitations, the FWS received 95 written comments, the vast majority of
which expressed support for the proposals.' The rules listing the two
species as threatened became effective in late 1986."6 In the final listing
rules, the FWS established June 18, 1987, as the date by which it would
designate critical habitat for both the loach minnow' 7 and the spikedace.'

58. See Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,380.
59. See Spikedace Listing Proposal, supra note 53, at 25,390.
60. See Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,380; Spikedace Listing
Proposal, supranote 53, at 25,390.
61. See Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,380; Spikedace Listing
Proposal, supranote 53, at 25,390.
62. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Loach Minnow, 51 Fed. Reg.
39,468-69 (1986) [hereinafter Loach Minnow Final Listing]; Determination of Threatened
Status for the Spikedace, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,769, 23,771 (1986) [hereinafter Spikedace Final
Listing).
63. See Lach Minnow Final Listing, supra note 62, at 39,469; Spikedace Final Listing,
supranote 62, at 23,771.
64. See Public Hearings and Reopening of Comment Periods on Proposed Threatened
Status and Critical Habitat for the Loach Minnow (Tiaroga Cobitis) and the Spikedace (Meda
Fulgida), 50 Fed. Reg. 37,703 (1985).
65. See Loach Minnow Final Listing, supra note 62, at 39,469; Spikedace Final Listing,
supranote 62, at 23,771. For the loach minnow, 67 of the comments were favorable, compared
to just 12 in opposition. See Loach Minnow Final Listing, supra note 62, at 39,469. Sixty-nine
letters expressed support for the spikedace proposal, and only 11 in opposition. See
Spikedace Final Listing, supranote 62, at 23,771.
66. Listing of the loach minnow became final on November 28,1986. See Loach Minnow
Final Listing, supra note 62, at 39,468. Final listing of the spikedace actually preceded that
of the loach minnow by several months; it came on July 31,1986. See Spikedace Final Listing,
supra note 62, at 23,769.
67. See Loach Minnow Final Listing, supra note 62, at 39,476.
68. See Spikedace Final Listing, supra note 62, at 23,779.
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B. Adoption of Recovery Plans
Following its listing of the loach minnow and the spikedace as
threatened, the FWS adopted recovery plans for the two species. In October,
1990, the FWS announced the availability of, and sought comment on, draft
recovery plans.6' The FWS received 73 written comments from a variety of
interested individuals and groups, to all of which the FWS responded.' The
Regional Director of the FWS approved both plans on September 30,1991.7'
Both recovery plans discussed the reasons for listing the loach minnow and
the spikedace, and outlined the steps the FWS deemed necessary for the
species' well-being. 2 The plans stressed that habitat improvement, which
might include the acquisition of available land and water rights, was a key
to recovery." The plans also reiterated the need to designate critical habitat,
which the FWS originally proposed in 1985,1 and which the FWS
subsequently committed to complete by 1987.7

69. See Availability of Draft Recovery Plans for Spikedace and Loach Minnow for
Review and Comment, 55 Fed. Reg. 43,045 (1990).
70. See U.S. FISH & WILiDFE SERV., AP. B FOR LOACH MINNow, TIAROGA COBITIS, AND
SPIKEDACE, MEDA FULGIDA, RECOVERY PLANS: COMMENTS AND RESPONSES (1991) [hereinafter
RECOVERY PLAN RESPONSES].
71. See U.S. FISH & WILDLxE SERVIC, LOACHMaO, TAROGA COBITIs, RECOVERY PLAN
at unnumbered title page (1991) [hereinafter LOACH MINNOW RECOVERY PLAN]; U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERVICE, SPIKEDACE, MEDA FULGIDA, RECOVERY PLAN at unnumbered title page
(1991) [hereinafter SPIIEDACE RECOVERY PLAN].
72. See generally LOACH MINNOW RECOVERY PLAN, supra note7l; SPIKEDACE RECOVERY
PLAN, supra note 71.
73. See LOACH MINNOW RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 71, at 12-15, 19-20; SPIKEDACE
RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 71, at 11-14,19.
74. See LOACH MINNOW RECOVERY PLAN, supra note71, at 37; SPICEACE RECOVERY PLAN,
supranote 71, at 37. The areas to be designated as critical habitat had been identified in the
original listing proposals. See Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,383-84;
Spikedace Listing Proposal, supranote 52, at 25,393-94.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68. Interestingly, the FWS's adoption of
recovery plans prior to its designation of critical habitat became the partial basis for Catron
County's suit, although it was not among the allegations decided by the Tenth Circuit.
Compl. for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Mandamus at 14-15, Board of
County Comm'rs of the County of Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.
(D.N.M. 1994) (No. CIV 93-730) [hereinafter Complaint]. The Commissioners argued that
adopting recovery plans before designating critical habitat "hindered, if not precluded,
effective public comment on the Recovery Plans, in violation of [the ESA]." Id. at 15. Catron
County further alleged that the adoption of the recovery plans "constitute[d] an attempt to
create de facto critical habitat," thus circumventing the critical habitat notice and comment
requirements of the ESA. Id. However, neither the ESA nor its implementing regulations
specify that critical habitat must be designated before recovery plans can be adopted. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424 (1997).
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C. Designation of Critical Habitat
On three occasions during the listing process, the FWS expressed
its intent to designate critical habitat for the loach minnow and the
spikedace7 6 Yet by late 1993, official designations were still forthcoming.
The seven year time lapse since the listing of the two species was a clear
violation of the ESA.! That violation prompted the Greater Gila
Biodiversity Project (GGBP), an Arizona environmental group, to file a suit
seeking to force the FWS to designate critical habitat." The FWS and the
GGBP reached a settlement just over three months after the suit was
initiated.' According to the settlement agreement, the FWS was to publish
in the Federal Register by February 1, 1994, rules making final the
designation of critical habitat!' The FWS did Aiot publish the final rules until
March 1994,' which then took effect on April 7, 19942 But because the

76. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68, 74-75.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
78. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Greater Gila Biodiversity Project v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D. Ariz. 1993) (No. CIV 93-1913 PHX PGR). In Catron
County's suit, filed nearly four months before that of the Greater Gila Biodiversity Project
(GGBP), see Compl., supra note 75, the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat within the
allowable time limit was also one of the grounds for complaint. Id. at 12-14. Rather than
seeking to compel designation, however, Catron County sought a judgment declaring the
FWS's failure a violation of the ESA, therefore making void its proposed designation. Id. at
18. Catron County also sought to have the FWS permanently enjoined from declaring critical
habitat for the loach minnow and the spikedace pursuant to the 1985 regulations, id. at 19,
and a writ of mandamus directing the FWS to withdraw the proposed critical habitat
designations. Id. at 21.
79. See Settlement Order, Greater Gila Biodiversity Project v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv. (D. Ariz. 1994) (No. 93-1913 PHX PGR) [hereinafter Settlement Order].
Perhaps because of the apparent ease with which the FWS was able to settle with GGBP, or
because the settlement directed the FWS to do something it might be constrained from doing
pending the outcome of Catron County's suit, Catron County referred to GGBP's suit as a
"friendly" one. Mot. for T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj. at 6, Board of County Comm'rs of the County
of Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D.N.M. 1994) (No. 93-730 HB/JHG).
The settlement may not have been as friendly as it appeared, however. Six months after the
FWS designated critical habitat for the two species, GGBP informed the FWS that it intended
to sue again because it considered the designations inadequate to protect the fish. Letter
from David Hogan, Staff Ecologist, GGBP, to Mollie Beattie, Director, John Rogers, Regional
Director, and Sam Spiller, State Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (Sept. 12,1994) (on file
with author). Of course, to the extent that the second suit might compel the FWS to do
something it might otherwise be able to do only after undertaking further administrative
procedures, it also might be thought of as friendly.
80. See Settlement Order, supra note 79, at 3.
81. See Designation of Critical Habitat for the Threatened Loach Minnow (Tiaroga
cobitis), 59 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1997)) [hereinafter Loach
Minnow Designation]; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Threatened Spikedace (Meda
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FWS substantially complied with the settlement agreement, the Arizona
District Court dismissed the suit with prejudice.83 Protection of critical
habitat for the loach minnow and the spikedace was official.
GGBP's suit was not necessarily determinative in the designation
of critical habitat, however. Prior to settling with GGBP, despite
appearances to the contrary, the FWS had taken several necessary first steps
toward the designation of critical habitat for the two species. When the FWS
first proposed listing the two species, it published descriptions of the areas
it thought suitable for critical habitat." In other words, the FWS had, almost
from the beginning of the listing process, an idea of the areas " essential to
the conservation of the species," ' even though it failed for several years to
promulgate final rules protecting those areas. Moreover, the FWS invited
comments on its first proposals of critical habitat," as the ESA requires!'
The FWS then invited interested parties to examine and comment on the
proposed critical habitat designations a second time when it reopened the
public comment periods in late 1985." Thus, the FWS made several efforts
to put the public on notice of the pending critical habitat designations.8 '
Were scientific considerations and public notice enough to justify
the designation of critical habitat, the FWS might have been able to make
the designations concurrently with listing. But because the implementing
agency must also take into account " economic... and.., other relevant

fulgida), 59 Fed. Reg. 10,906 (1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1997)) [hereinafter Spikedace Designation).
82. Loach Minnow Designation, supra note 81, at 10,898; Spikedace Designation, supra
note 81, at 10,906.
83. Notice of Dismissal With Prejudice, Greater Gila Biodiversity Project v. United
States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D. Ariz. 1994) (No. CIV 93-1913). Dismissal was pursuant to a
provision of the settlement agreement. Settlement Order, supra note 79, at 3.

84. Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,383-84; Spikedace Listing
Proposal, supra note 53, at 25,393-94.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I) (1994) (definition of "critical habitat').
86.

Loach Minnow Listing Proposal, supra note 52, at 25,380; Spikedace Listing Proposal,

supra note 53, at 25,390.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
88.

See supra text accompanying notes 64.

89. In all, the FWS received 111 written comments regarding the critical habitat proposal
for the loach minnow, Loach Minnow Designation, supra note 81, at 10,898, and 112
comments regarding the critical habitat proposal for the spikedace. Spikedace Designation,

supra note 81, at 10,908. It is unclear whether those totals include the comments the FWS
received in response to the original listing proposals, we supra text accompanying note 65,
although it seems likely because the FWS solicited comments to the critical habitat proposal
throughout the listing process. None of the comments, positive or negative, to either of the
designation proposals were from Catron County. Loach Minnow Designation, supra note 81,

at 10,899; Spikedace Designation, supra note 81, at 10,908.
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inpact[s]"" when designating critical habitat, the FWS had work yet to do.
Citing "the complexity of the economic analysis that must accompany the
final rule designating critical habitats and the large number of comments
and data received on the[ ][proposed] habitats," the FWS opted not to make
designations for either species when it published the rules making listing
final." The FWS stated that final listing, even without the designation of
critical habitat, would make "immediate protection" for the loach minnow
and the spikedace possible.'
The FWS then hired a Santa Fe, New Mexico, consulting firm to do
analyses to help untangle the complex economic data associated with the
designations. The resulting reports assessed the costs that those affected
by the critical habitat designations might expect from the curtailment or
alteration of various federal, state, and private land use activities in and
around the designated areas." The consulting firm obtained its data from
a variety of sources, including: responses to the listing proposals; those who
attended a meeting in Silver City, New Mexico, in May, 1992; and federal,
state, county, and local agencies, and individuals who either owned
property or were involved in permitted uses of lands within the areas to be
designated as critical habitat." The preparers used the information to
calculate expected costs both by land use activity and by area." Whether
successful or not, the reports were an attempt at a comprehensive analysis
of the possible economic impacts of the proposed designations. The FWS
was then able to use the information to do the necessary balancing of
benefits and harms before it designated critical habitat. 7
With the addition of the economic analyses, the FWS had a sizable
administrative record on which to base its critical habitat designations.

90. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
91. Loach Minnow Final Listing, supra note 62, at 39,469; Spikedace Final Listing, supra
note 62, at 23,771.
92. Loach Minnow Final Listing, supra note 62 at 39,469; Spikedace Final Listing, supra
note 62, at 23,771.
93. KARL SOUDER & ASSOCIATES, INC., ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
DESIGNATING CRITICAL HABITAT FOR TIAROGA COITIs (LOACH MINNOW) (1992) [hereinafter
SOUDER REPORT ]; KARL SOUDER & ASSOCIATES, INC., ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
DESIGNATING CRITICAL HABITAT FOR MEDA FULGIDA (SPIKEDACE) (1992) [hereinafter SOUDER
REPORT II].
94. See generally SOUDER REPORT I, supranote 93.
95. SOUDRREPoRT I, supra note 93, at 3; SOUDER REPORT II, supra note 93, at 3. Implicit

in the identification of sources of material used in the economic analyses is the fact that the
effected public got yet another chance to participate in the critical habitat designation
process during the preparation of the SOUDER REPORTS.
96. SOUDER REPORT I, supra note 93, at 56-64; SOUDER REPORT II, supra note 93, at 46-53.
97. See supratext accompanying notes 29-31.
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However, following the settlement of its suit with GGBP,98 and before the
effective date of the rules designating Critical habitat,? the FWS added more
data to the administrative record. On February 2,1994, the FWS completed
"Takings Implication Assessments" (TiAs) of the critical habitat
designations for the loach minnow and the spikedace." TIAs grew out of
Executive Order (E.O.) 1 2 ,63 0 .1m As the name implies, a TIA is an
evaluation of the likelihood that a federal agency action will restrict private
land use to the extent that the restriction amounts to a "taking" for which
compensation is necessary.' °2 The FWS prepared the TIAs following
requests that they do so by several of the respondents to the draft recovery
plans, including Catron County.l In support of their requests, the majority
of respondents quoted the following language from E.O. 12,630:
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.... Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, in reaffirming the fundamental protection of
property rights provided by the Fifth Amendment and in
assessing the nature of governmental actions that have an
impact on Constitutionally protected private property rights,
have also reaffirmed that governmental actions that do not
formally invoke the condemnation power, includingregulation,
may result
in a taking for which just compensation is
10
required. '
What all of those requesting TIAs failed to note, however, was that
E.O. 12,630 "is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Executive branch and is not intended to createany rightor benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its

98.
99.

See supra text accompanying notes 7943.
See supra text accompanying note 82.

100. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Takings Implications Assessment: Designation of
Critical Habitat for the Loach minnow (Feb. 2,1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Loach
minnow TIA]; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Takings Implications Assessment: Designation
of Critical Habitat for the Spikedace (Feb. 2, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter

Spikedace TIA].
101. Exec. Order No. 12,630,53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988); 49 C.F.R. § 29.8(n) (1997).
102. See id.
103. RECOVERY PLAN RESONMs, supranote 70, at 44-45,51,53-55,57-59, 61-64, 67. Those
requesting that TIAs be completed actually asked the FWS to prepare TIAs to evaluate the

effects of implementing the recovery plans. Id. Nevertheless, the TIAs the FWS prepared
dealt with the designations of critical habitat. Loach minnow TIA, supranote 100; Spikedace
TIA, supra note 100.
104. See, e.g, Response of Board of Supervisors of Apache County, Arizona, RECOVERY
PLAN REsroNSES, supra note 70, at 57 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg 8859

(1988)).
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agencies, its officers, or any person. " "' Thus, the FWS had no obligation to
prepare the TIAs, but did so anyway. After completing its analyses, the
FWS concluded that the designating critical habitat for the loach minnow
and the spikedace would not likely result in any takings of private
property."0 At least temporarily, the designations would stand.
II.

CHANGING ATTITUDES IN CATRON COUNTY

Despite being informed of the possible listings of the loach minnow
and the spikedace as early as 1983,1°7 the government of Catron County was
largely silent during the early stages of the listing process. The Southwest
New Mexico Council of Governments, of which Catron County was a
member, responded favorably to pre-proposal inquiries regarding the
possible listings. " However, of the nearly 100 responses the FWS received
to the 1985 listing proposals,"° the only one to come from what might be
considered a political subdivision of Catron County, was not from the
Board of Commissioners, but from an irrigation district" 0
Government officials were not the only ones in Catron County who
were silent about the listing proposals; the general population was as well.
For example, at the time they were made, the proposals failed to garner any
mention in the local newspaper. This might not seem unusual, except that
at about the same time the FWS proposed to list the loach minnow and the
spikedace, the Catron County Firestartepublished several stories about other

105. 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (emphasis added). This latter point was not lost on the New
Mexico Federal District Court. In a case in which the court upheld a Forest Service decision
to reduce the plaintiff's grazing permit, the court, quoting the foregoing section of the E.O.,
said that the plaintiff had "nobasis to assert a claim against the Forest Service concerning
compliance with E.O. 12630." McKinley v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 888,893 (D.N.M. 1993).
106. Loach minnow 11A, supra note 100, at 4; Spikedace TIA,supra note 100, at 4.
107. Letter from Assistant Regional Director, US. Fish & Wildlife Service, to the County
Commissioner, Catron County (July 15, 1983) (pre-proposal description of the possible
listings) (on file with author).
108. Letter from Executive Committee, Southwest New Mexico Council of Governments,
to New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (Oct. 7,1983) (on file with author).
109. See supr text accompanying note 65.
110. Letter from Vernon Hollimon, President, Pleasonton Eastside Ditch Company,
Glenwood, NM, to U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Aug. 13, 1985) (on file with author). The
Catron County Commission's unresponsiveness was in stark contrast to the actions of an
Arizona county that believed it would suffer flood damage if the FWS were to designate the
proposed critical habitat. See Letter from Representative Jim Kolbe, 5th District of Arizona,
to Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior (June 3,1986) (on file with author); Letter from
Representative Eldon Rudd, 4th District of Arizona, to Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the
Interior (May 14, 1986) (on file with author). Although it initially failed to do so, Catron
County would later make this same claim. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429,1433 (1996).
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federal agency actions affecting the area."' The first time either the loach
minnow or the spikedace received mention in the Firestarterwas months
after their listings became effective, in a story about a proposed Gila River
dam project."12 Thus, to the extent that a local newspaper may be said to
reflect the attitudes and concerns of its readers, it appeared that the citizens
of Catron County were, at worst, indifferent to the listings.
Measured by this same standard, the attitudes of those in Catron
County began to change significantly in late 1989 and early 1990. It was at
that time that several individuals and governments in western New Mexico3
and eastern Arizona came together to form the Coalition of Counties."
Among the original purposes of the Coalition of Counties were to "[p]rotect
the rural economies of Arizona and New Mexico," to "[e]stablish, define
and protect the vested rights of individuals and industries heavily
dependent upon utilizing resources from federal lands," and to "[w]ork to
prevent the taking of vested property rights by State or Federal regulatory
agencies without guaranteeing the payment of just compensation."" 4 In
support of the goals of the Coalition of Counties, the Catron County Firestarterpublished a series of articles on regulatory takings that, in discussing
E.O. 12,630 and TIAs, echoed several of the responses to the draft recovery
plans."' The articles concluded:
What began as a Catron County stand, has, in a few weeks,
spread to five adjoining Arizona counties and a number of
New Mexico counties. It is perceived that this is going to be
the largest issue facing the Western United States in the 90's.
Our ride on the "regulatory tiger" has now reached the point
that virtually all private property rights are threatened."6
The rhetoric in the Firestartersubsequently became even more
pointed. The author of one article, describing what he or she believed to be
111. E.g, Commissioners to Study Possible Solution to ForestRoad Access, CATRON CoUNTY
FIRSTARTER, Aug. 13, 1985, at 1; Gila National Forest Plan- DEIS Public Comment Period
Extended, CATRON COUNTY FIRESTARTU, Aug. 28, 1985, at 1; PrescribedNaturalFires in Gila

Wildernes, CATRON COUNTY FIRESFARTER, Sept. 17,1985, at 1.
112.

Studies Continuing on Upper Gila River Water Supply, CATRON COUNTY FIRESARTER,

Nov. 11, 1986, at I ("The listing of the spikedace minnow as an endangered species [sic] in
July makes construction of any large mainstream dam highly unlikely.').
113. Coalitionof Counties Growing- New Members Sought, CATRON COUNTY FIRTART,
June 8, 1990, at I [hereinafter CoalitionGrowing].
114. CoalitionofCounties Continues Growthand Organization,CATRON COUNTY FMESARTER,
May 11, 1990, at 4.
115. Governmental Actions & UnconstitutionalTakings, PartI: Background, CATRON COUNTY
FIRFSTARTrm , Jan. 19, 1990, at 3; Governmental Actions & UnconstitutionalTakings, Part II:
Riding the Tiger, CATRON COUNtY F sTRER, Feb. 12,1990, at 3 [hereinafter Unconstitutional
Takings II; see also supra note 103.
116. UnconstitutionalTakings II, supranote 115, at 4.
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the origins of the environmental movement and the link between
environmentalism and the perceived threat to private property rights,
opined:
The turn of the century supporters of the conservation
movement were... the lords of the "Robber Baron Era" of
our nation's western expansion. At the same time these
people were bankrolling people like John Muir and Aldo
Leopold, they were driving small ranches [sic], farmers, and
miners off their western homesteads.... Control of these vast
natural resources continues today, aided by their progenys'
[sic] well-financed illusion that these [federal] lands are held
in public trust. These people are not satisfied with having
control of close to 80% of the western land. They are also
lobbying vast sums from the state and federal treasuries to
buy up the remaining 20 percent of remaining [sic] private
land. With the rural population diminished and prohibited
from entering these vast lands, the door will be left open for
the final plundering
with no one the wiser and no one left to
117
complain.
The article closed with an invitation to join the Coalition of
Counties, but said that those not opposed to: "1) Socialistic nationalization
of resources and production; 2) confiscation of private property; 3)
termination of multiple uses of public land; 4) discontinuation of hunting,
camping and other recreational uses of public land; and 5) blatant violation
of constitutional guarantees," may not wish to join."'
Much more significant than the most vitriolic rhetoric in the local
newspaper, however, was the passage of a series of county ordinances
aimed at increasing the county's role in federal land use planning. The
Catron County Commission enacted the first such ordinance in 1991. 1"
Over the next several months, the Commission passed a number of related
ordinances, culminating in the adoption of the Catron County
Comprehensive Land Plan " (Land Plan). The Land Plan is a dizzying array
of excerpts from a host of local, state, and federal laws, with words such as
117. CoalitionGrowing, supra note 113, at 6. The reference to Aldo Leopold is, in a sense,
rather curious. It is certainly true that he became an outspoken advocate of the rights of
nature, but he spent a significant portion of his early career working for the Forest Service
in the area now encompassed by the communities making up the Coalition of Counties. As
a Forest Service employee, the government, not early supporters of conservationism, paid
him to help eliminate wolves and other predators from the area. See ALDO LEOPOLD, Thinking
Like a Mountain and Escudilla, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC; WIH EssAYs ON CONSERVATION
FROM ROUND RIVER 137-45 (Ballantine Books 1966) (1953).
118. Coalition Growing,supra note 113, at 6.

119. Catron County, N.M., Ordinance No. 004-91 (May 21,1991).
120. Board of Commissioners of Catron County, Res. No. 005-93 (Sept. 1,1992).
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"coordinate," "preserve," and "culture" or "cultural" highlighted for
emphasis."n The focus of the Land Plan is Catron County's ability to right
perceived wrongs suffered by its citizens as a result of various federal
actions; to preserve the County's "customs and culture." This is made clear
in the Plan's Introduction:
Catron County is facing challenges to the viability of its
economy and the well being of its citizens. Catron County is
especially vulnerable to these challenges because over 70
percent of Catron County is under the jurisdiction of
government land agencies. Federal land agency decisions
have adversely affected county sovereignty, eroded private
property rights, and diminished democratic principles.
Catron County government, however, does have a legal
framework provided in the U.S. Constitution and existing
federal and state laws and regulation.The basic county sovereign
authority is to protect
the health, safety and economic well1
being of its citizens. 22
According to the writers of the Land Plan, that "legal framework"
includes, for example, a combination of state laws and local ordinances that
apparently make it an offense for an employee of a federal agency to
attempt to effectuate federal laws on land within Catron County.'23
The Land Plan contains some obvious errors and overstatements.
For example, the Land Plan says that "[ilt is difficult to state precisely what
constitutes federal wildlife law because of the important doctrine of state
ownership of resident wildlife." 24 In fact, the Supreme Court has long since
repudiated the state ownership doctrine." Furthermore, the Land Plan
arguably mischaracterizes E.O. 12,630, calling it "an important tool which
can be exercised by local government."' But as noted, E.O. 12,630 created
neither procedural nor substantive rights of any kind.' And the Land Plan

121. See BOARDOFCommmONOFCATRON COUNTY, CATRON COUNTY CoMpRE.HNsrvs
LAND PLAN (1992) [hereinafter LAND PLAN].

122. id. at -1.
123. Id. at A1-37.
124. Id. at A1-34.
125. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In upholding the validity of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (1994), Justice Holmes wrote:
No doubt it is true that between a State and its inhabitants the State may
regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its
authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State
upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the
possession of anyone; and possession is the beginningof ownership.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added).
126. LAND PLAN, supra note 121, at AI-35
127. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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makes assertions about what the citizens of Catron County believe
necessary to maintain their desired quality of life based on a survey that
had a meager 17 percent response rate."2 Still, relying on the survey, the
compilers of the Land Plan contend, for example, that 25 percent of the
residents of the county believe that a reduction in "governmental
interference" would help protect the resources and improve the
environment of Catron County.12 These "statistics" may indeed reflect the
attitudes and desires of the majority of citizens in Catron County. However,
to plot the political course of the entire county based on the input of fewer
than one in five of its citizens would seem to be the same diminishment of
democratic principles that the Land Plan decries."0 Moreover, it is
particularly ironic in light of one of the charges the Catron County
Commission would make against the FWS in its suit; namely, that the FWS
designated critical habitat for the loach minnow and the spikedace without
allowing the Commission to participate. 31
Despite its flaws, the Catron County Land Plan, and the ordinances
on which it is based, are like icons in some rural counties in the western
United States. Several western counties, including counties in Idaho,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, as well as other counties in New Mexico,
have enacted similar ordinances' The Land Plan is so popular, in fact, that
the National Federal Lands Conference, the Land Plan's publisher, sells
copies of it for $250 apiece at conferences designed to educate interested
groups on how to have similar plans adopted in their areas.13 And it was
in the spirit of the convictions articulated in the Land Plan that the Catron
County Commission filed its suit against the FWS.
TV. THE SUIT: THE APPLICABILITY OF NEPA TO CRITICAL
HABITAT DESIGNATION
Although Catron County ultimately became proactive in its
approach to federal land use planning, it might have been for naught where
the loach minnow and the spikedace are concerned. By the time Catron
County filed its suit against the FWS, in mid-1993, the listings of the two
fish were complete."3 Catron County did challenge the validity of the

128.
129.

LAND PLAN, supra note 121, at A2-1.
Id. at A2-4.

130. See supra text accompanying note 122.
131. Complaint, supra note 75, at 4; see also infra Part IV.B.
132. See Andrea Hungerford, 'Custom and Culture" Ordinances:Not a Wise Move for the
Wise Use Movement, 8 Tu. ENvTL.L.J. 458 (1995).
133. Id. at 460.
134. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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listings based on alleged violations of the ESA, 1' s but these arguments were
not particularly strong. The administrative record indicates that the FWS
followed the ESA's required listing procedures." Whether as a result of
procedural insufficiencies or of their own complacency, neither the
residents nor the leaders of Catron County participated very actively in the
listing process. 37
In addition, by the time Catron County filed suit, the FWS had
taken several of the necessary steps toward designating critical habitats for
the loach minnow and the spikedace."1 Catron County was no more active
in this process than it had been in the listing process.'' Even if it had been,
a successful challenge to the critical habitat designation procedures the FWS
had followed to that point was far from certain. That is because, apart from
the delay in making final the designations,"4 the FWS had followed all of
the ESA's procedures for designating critical habitat." Any challenge to the
FWS's actions to that point would therefore implicate the ESA more than its
administration. Rather than challenging the largely completed ESA process,
then, Catron County chose instead to attack aggressively the FWS's failure
to comply with NEPA, which it contended the FWS should have done befor
designating critical habitat. But if a successful challenge to the FWS's actions
pursuant to the ESA was uncertain, so too was the likelihood of success on
the argument that the FWS must comply with NEPA prior to undertaking
the procedures of the ESA."
The following sections describe NEPA's statutory framework, the
procedural history of Catron County's case, and the context within which
the case fits. At the heart of the case were theories of NEPA application and
exemption that evolved as the litigation progressed. In discussing the
procedural history of the case, the documents the parties filed with the
district and appellate courts are cited frequently because they shed
considerable light on the theories' evolution. To put the arguments into
their proper context, significant attention is then paid to the several theories
of NEPA exemption spawned by courts since NEPA's enactment.

135. Complaint, supra note 75, at 10-15. Specifically, Catron County alleged violations
of the ESA's notice requirements, Id. at 10-12, of the requirement that critical habitat be
designated no more than two years following listing, Id. at 12-14, and of the procedures for
adopting recovery plans. Id. at 14-15. This portion of the suit is still pending.
136. See supra Parts I, II.A.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
138. See supra Part II.C.
139. See supra note 89. As noted, it was only during the process of adopting recovery
plans that Catron County finally got involved. See supra text accompanying note 103.
140. See supratext accompanying notes 76-77.
141. See supraParts I, I.C.
142. That is because the argument was essentially without precedent. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The NEPA Process
NEPA is a marvel of brevity; a seeming rarity among federal
legislation. Nevertheless, it has had a considerable impact on the conduct
of administrative agencies, especially those whose responsibilities are in
some way environmental. The purposes of NEPA include "declar[ing] a
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
promot[ing] efforts which will
between man and his environment; [and] ...
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man."143 To effectuate its purposes,
NEPA established certain procedural guidelines for executive agencies to
follow when planning their actions.1" NEPA also created a Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) responsible for interpreting the Act, and for
promulgating regulations for implementing it.'"
NEPA's core procedural requirements are found in section 102.'
Section 102 directs administrative agencies to "[u]tilize a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach" to their actions, in order to integrate natural,
social, and environmental sciences in decision making.] Section 102 further
directs agencies, to help ensure that they give due consideration to the
environment during the decision making process, to consult with the CEQ
throughout.'" Most importantly, section 102 directs agencies, "to the fullest
extent possible," to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation or other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

143. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).

144. Id.§§431-35.
145. Id.§§ 4342-47.
146. Id.§ 4332.
147. Id. § 4332(2)(A).

148. Id.§ 4332(2)(B).
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(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented. 4 9
Taken together, the consideration by an agency of the possible
environmental consequences of a proposed action and the preparation of
the resulting "detailed statement" are commonly known as the "NEPA
process."
'The Supreme Court has said that the "twin aims" of the NEPA
process are: 1) "to inject environmental considerations into the federal
agency[ ]decisionmaking process by requiring [an] agency to prepare an
[environmental impact statement];" and 2) "to inform the public that [an]
agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking
process. "05° Although the language of section 102(2)(C) is said to be "actionforcing,"' s' it "does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes
the necessary process." 15 2 Stated otherwise, "NEPA's purpose is not to
generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster excellent
action."5 3
That is not to say that the NEPA process does not generate
paperwork. Frequently, the NEPA process results in the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS)-the "detailed statement" of section
102(2)(C).1 4 The fundamental purpose of an EIS is to have an agency

149.
150.

Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v).
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143

(1981).
151. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
152. Id.
153. Council on Environmental Quality, Purpose, Policy, and Mandate, 40 C.F.R. §
1500.1(c) (1997).
154. An agency need not prepare an EIS in every case. In fact, before preparing an EIS
an agency normally (unless it is certain that a particular action will require the preparation
of an EIS) first prepares an environmental assessment (EA). See Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026,
18,037 (1981). Like an EIS, an EA includes discussions of the possible environmental
consequences of a proposed action, only in less detail. Id. Also like an EIS, an EA must be
made available to the public. Id. Through the process of preparing an EA,an agency decides
whether to prepare a more detailed EIS, or to issue a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI). Id. Because the considerations for an EA and an EIS are, in general, the same,
references throughout the remainder of the paper to NEPA documentation will be only to
EISs.
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perform a case-by-case balancing of the economic and technical benefits of
a proposed action against its environmental costs.'-5 "The point of the
individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, with possible alterations,
the optimally beneficial action is finally taken."'- 6 As such, an EIS is to
"provide [a] full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts
and . . . [to] inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable
alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance
the quality of the human environment."5 7
The consideration of alternatives to a proposed action is an
important part of the NEPA process. It is necessary in projects intended to
benefit the environment, as well as those that may cause environmental
harm.2m But the consideration of alternatives is "subject to a construction of
reasonableness."" An agency need only consider the "readily identifiable"
effects of alternatives.' 60 Likewise, an agency may omit from consideration
alternatives that it deems "only remote and speculative."" Ultimately, the
consideration of alternatives "ensure[s] that each agency decision maker has
before him and takes into proper account all possible approaches to a
particular project."' 62
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the NEPA process requires
that agencies give the public notice of, and an opportunity to comment on,
proposed actions. In fact, NEPA authorizes public input throughout the
process. For example, agencies are to solicit comments on any draft EISs
they prepare.' 63 Similarly, they are to invite parties potentially affected by
agency action to participate in a process known as "scoping," during which
agencies discuss with other participants the specific issues an EIS will
address."' In this way the second aim of the NEPA process is satisfied."6

155. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109,1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
156. Id.
157. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. §
1502.1 (1997).
158. United States v. South Fla. Water Mgmt Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567,1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)).
159. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 838.
162. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comn'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
163. Council on Environmental Quality, Commenting, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1,1503.4 (1997).
164. Council on Environmental Quality, NEPA and Agency Planning, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7
(1997).
165. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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B. Procedural History
1. District Court

Of the several allegations in its complaint,"t Catron County chose
first to test the FWS's ability to designate critical habitat without having
completed the NEPA process. The argument was simple. Because NEPA
directs agencies to prepare EISs before taking major federal action, and
because the designation of critical habitat is a major federal action, the
FWS's failure to prepare an EIS prior to designating critical habitat was a
violation of NEPA. 67
Despite the undeniable appeal of the simplicity of Catron County's
argument, the theory was virtually, though not entirely, untested. In 1985,
in response to the initial listing proposals, Phelps Dodge Corporation, a
mining company with operations near the Gila River in eastern Arizona,
wrote a letter to the FWS suggesting that designating critical habitat without
undertaking the NEPA process was without legal support." Lacking the
legal expertise to respond to Phelps Dodge's comment, the regional office
turned for help to the Director of the FWS in Washington, D.C." Perhaps
to give itself more time to answer, and because the FWS received the letter
after the closing of the original comment period, the FWS returned the letter
to Phelps Dodge and asked them to re-submit it when the comment period
re-opened after the public hearings. 7 '
The national office of the FWS sought help from the Solicitor's
Office." In a memorandum from the Assistant Solicitor for Fish and
Wildlife to the Associate Director of the FWS, the Solicitor's Office conceded

166. See supra notes 75, 78, and 131 and accompanying text. In addition, Catron County
alleged that the FWS violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS before adopting recovery
plans. Complaint, supranote 75, at 15-17. Catron County also alleged that the FWS violated
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3) (1994), for failing to produce an
administrative record adequate to support its decisions regarding the critical habitat
designations and the recovery plan adoptions. Complaint, supra note 75, at 17-19.
167. Complaint, supra note 75, at 15-17.

168.

Letter from Ken C. Bennett, Executive Assistant, Phelps Dodge Corporation, to Jerry

L. Stegman, Acting Regional Director, Region 2, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Aug. 19,1985)
(on file with author).
169. Memorandum from Jerry L Stegman, Acting Regional Director, Region 2, U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service to the Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Aug. 29, 1985) (on file with
author).
170. Letter from Michael J. Spear, Regional Director, Region 2, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
to Ken C. Bennett, Executive Assistant, Phelps Dodge Corporation(Sept. 20, 1985) (on file with
author).
171. Memorandum from Donald J. Barry, Assistant Solicitor, Fish and Wildlife, to the
Associate Director, Federal Assistance, Fish & Wildlife Service (Nov. 5, 1985) (on file with
author).
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that Phelps Dodge's contention had merit, but offered several reasons for
believing that NEPA should not apply to critical habitat designations."
Among the reasons offered was that requiring the FWS to comply with
NEPA when designating critical habitat would not further purposes of
either the ESA or NEPA. Also, and more significantly, the Solicitor's Office
suggested that the economic and environmental data the FWS analyzes
during the designation process, coupled with FWS compliance with the
ESA's notice and comment requirements, "should provide, at the very least,
the functional equivalent of NEPA documentation. " '
There is nothing in the administrative record that indicates whether
the FWS responded directly to Phelps Dodge when it made its first inquiry;
that is, whether the FWS or the Solicitor's Office ever passed the
information in the memorandum on to Phelps Dodge. Phelps Dodge
renewed its challenge, however, in its comments to the draft recovery
plans. 74 The FWS's official response to both inquiries, which it gave when
it officially designated critical habitat, was that the designation procedures
of the ESA are the functional equivalent of the NEPA process, as the
Solicitor's memorandum had suggested."m
It seems likely that Phelps Dodge's inquiries played a role in the
development of Catron County's theory of its case. Whether they did or not,
a nearly identical case from the Federal District Court of Oregon certainly
played a role in the development of Catron County's case. In Douglas
County v. Lujan 76 (Douglas County 1), the county challenged the FWS's
failure to perform the NEPA process before designating critical habitat for
the northern spotted owl." The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment on the issue.17 Douglas County posited the same "major action
requires NEPA" argument that Catron County would use.' 79 The FWS
countered that it was not required to perform the NEPA process when
designating critical habitat, an argument based on the reasoning of Pacific
Legal Foundationv. Andrus, 0 a case dealing with the question of whether
the FWS need comply with NEPA during the ESA listing process.

172. Id. at 1-2.
173. Id. at 2.
RECOVERY PLAN RESPONSES, supra note 70, at 30.
175. Loach Minnow Designation, supra note 81, at 10,901; Spikedace Designation, supra
note 81, at 10,910.
174.

176.

810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d

1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996) [hereinafter Douglas County 1.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1472.

Id.
Id. at 1477.
657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
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PacificLegal is one of a line of cases dealing with NEPA exemption
based on statutory conflict.181 The court concluded that the FWS is exempt
from NEPA compliance during listing, but it did not address the question
of exemption during the designation of critical habitat. 82 In Douglas County
I, the FWS therefore sought to extend the conflict exemption to the
designation of critical habitat. The FWS made several arguments, all based
on Pacific Legal. The first was that it should be exempt from the NEPA
process when designating critical habitat because it lacks statutory
discretion when making designation decisions." Apparently, the FWS
meant to imply that its limited discretion conflicts with NEPA's mandate to
consider alternatives. In addition, the FWS argued that the legislative
histories of the two statutes reveal Congress' intent that NEPA not apply to
critical habitat designation.' ' The FWS also argued that the designation
process required it to consider all relevant impacts, and that NEPA
documents would be essentially duplicative.r However, as if to
foreshadow its conclusion, the court described the FWS's sole reliance on
Pacific Legal as "putting all of their eggs in one arguably vulnerable
basket."' 8 The basket proved vulnerable indeed, as the court ruled for
Douglas County, opting not to expand the reasoning of Pacific Legal to
include critical habitat designation.'
Catron County's case lagged approximately one year behind
DouglasCounty L Thus, Catron County was able to pattern its litigation on
that of Douglas County. Accordingly, Catron County, just as Douglas
County had done, moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of
NEPA compliance." In support of its motion, Catron County relied heavily

181. See infra Part V.A. In concluding that there is a conflict between the ESA's listing
procedures and NEPA, the Sixth Circuit's analysis was four-pronged; it concluded: 1) filing
an EIS does not serve the purposes of the ESA, 657 F.2d at 835; 2) filing an EIS does not serve
the purposes of NEPA, id. at 836; 3) listing furthers the purposes of NEPA, even without the
preparation of an EIS, id. at 837; and 4) the legislative histories of the ESA and of NEPA
suggest that Congress did not intend for NEPA to apply to ESA listing decisions. Id. at
839-40.
182. 657 F.2d at 841.
183. Douglas County 1,810 F. Supp. at 1480.
184. Id. at 1482.
185. Id. As the court recognized, this latter argument is akin to the notion that the ESA's
critical habitat designation requirements are the functional equivalent of the NEPA
requirements, although the FWS denied making such an argument. Id. n.4.
186. Id. In so criticizing the FWS's refusal to entertain an alternative theory of exemption,
the court may have meant to suggest that functional equivalence would have been a more
plausible grounds for exemption.
187. Id. at 1485.
188. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Catron,
N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D. N.M. 1994) (No. CIV 93-730).
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on Douglas County 189 It began with the premise that NEPA exemption is
only allowable where there is a clear statutory conflict.' 9' Catron County
then highlighted the characteristics that distinguished Pacific Legal and the
listing process from critical habitat designation, as the Douglas County I
court had done.'" Then, to drive its point home, Catron County argued:
Imposing the requirement upon FWS to analyze the impacts
of critical habitat designations for the spikedace and loach
minnow would neither duplicate information the FWS is
already required to develop under the ESA, nor represents
information that FWS may not legally consider. In fact, the
requirements of NEPA will enhance the information available
to FWS in making the critical habitat designations.92
With (albeit non-binding) precedent to support it, Catron County's
argument seemed a strong one.
The FWS, undeterred by the adverse decision in Douglas County I,
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.'" Rather than turning to a
different theory of exemption, the FWS attempted to clarify the theory it
had pursued unsuccessfully in Douglas County I. It took pains to point out
what it believed were the Oregon District Court's errors in construing
Pacific Legal." The FWS's most vociferous argument was that the court in
DouglasCounty I misapplied the PacificLegal factors."' It urged:
[N]either the purposes of NEPA nor those of the ESA are
served through application of NEPA to the Secretary's
designation of critical habitat because, under the clear terms
of the applicable statutory language, the only impacts NEPA
would require to be considered in addition to those already
mandated to be considered when designating critical habitat
are "irrelevant" to designation."

189. See Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for Partial Sutm. J. at 21-28, Board of County
Comm'rs of the County of Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D. N.M. 1994)

(No. CIV 93-730).
190. Id. at 21.

191. Id. at 22-23.
192. Id.at 24.
193. Defs.' Cross-mot. for Partial Summ. J.,
Board of County Comm'rs of the County of
Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D. N.M. 1994) (No. CIV 93-730).
194. Defs.' Reply Mem. in Support of Cross-mot. for Summ. J.at 8-18, Board of County
Comm'rs of the County of Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. (D. N.M.

1994) (No. CIV 93-730) [hereinafter Defs.' Reply Mem.].
195. See supra note 181.
196. Defs.' Reply Mem., supra note 194, at 11.
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The FWS concluded that the Douglas County I court's analysis was flawed
'
because it failed to understand the importance of the foregoing argument. 9
The FWS also sought to clarify its theory through a discussion of
another NEPA exemption case from the Ninth Circuit, Merrel v. Thomas.' "
It encouraged the court to find, as the Ninth Circuit had in similar
circumstances in Merrell,that amendments to the critical habitat designation
procedures of the ESA, made in the face of a FWS policy not to prepare
NEPA documents when designating critical habitat, indicated Congress'
intent that NEPA not apply to designations.'" The FWS also argued, still
relying on Merrell, that "[t]he amendments addressing the designation of
critical habitat... are a carefully crafted legislative compromise which leave
little room for the imposition of procedures required by NEPA."'
Ultimately, the FWS failed to persuade the New Mexico District
Court of the correctness of its arguments. The court, in a brief, unpublished
opinion, said without further explanation: "The Court finds the analysis in
Douglas County [1] persuasive and will grant Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether NEPA applies to the FWS's
designation of critical habitat.., for the same reasons articulated in Douglas

County [M."'
2. On Appeal
The decision in the lower court appeared to be a real victory for
Catron County, but an appeal by the FWS soon followed. And just as it had
in the lower court, the case became intertwined with Douglas County's
when it reached the Tenth Circuit. That is, Douglas County I had been on
appeal during the early stages of Catron County's litigation. Shortly after
the New Mexico District Court ruled on Catron County's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment the Ninth Circuit announced its decision in the appeal
of Douglas County L Thus, a brief discussion of the outcome of the Douglas
County I appeal helps to frame the FWS's appeal in Catron County.
In Douglas County v. Babbitt2 (DouglasCounty I1), the Ninth Circuit
reversed the District Court of Oregon primarily because it believed

197. Id. at 14.
198. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
199. Federal Defs.' Mem. in Support of Cross-mot. for Partial Suumr. J.and in Opp'n to
Pl.'s Mots. for Partial Sumr. J. and T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj. at 25-27, Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. (D.
N.M. 1994) (No. CIV 93-730).
200. Id. at 28.
201. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Catron, N.M. v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv., No. CIV 93-730, slip op. at 10 (D. N.M. Oct. 13,1994).
202. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698
(1996) [hereinafter Douglas County II].
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Congress intended that the procedures of the ESA displace those of
NEPA.3 In reaching that conclusion, the court built on its own reasoning
in Merrell v. Thomas.' The court looked at the legislative history of the
sections of the ESA dealing with critical habitat designation and concluded
that the designation procedures made the NEPA process "superfluous."2
Important to the court's analysis was the fact that the current critical habitat
designation procedures were amended in 1978, eight years after the
implementation of NEPA.2N To the Ninth Circuit this implied Congress'
choice not to incorporate the NEPA process into the ESA.2 Secondarily, the
court did the four part PacificLegal analysis and concluded that requiring
the FWS to go through the NEPA process when designating critical habitat
furthered the purposes of neither statute.' Moreover, the court also
concluded that NEPA does not apply to actions that do not alter the
environment."0 Finally, as an aside, the court suggested that its conclusion
might also have been supported by a functional equivalence exemption.2"
Douglas County II turned the tables in Catron County's suit. On
appeal it was the FWS who could trumpet the wisdom of another court's
decision-and trumpet it they did, arguing that, "[a]s the court of appeals
found in Douglas County v. Babbitt,a similar result is warranted here." 2 The
FWS concluded, citing Douglas County II:
Given that Congress has expressly directed the Secretary to
consider only certain information in determining critical
habitat, while at the same time setting a "bottom line" that
requires the Secretary to designate an area as critical habitat
if the failure to do so "will result in the extinction of the
species concerned," the district court erred in imposing the
further procedural requirements of NEPA on that process.
Introduction of the NEPA process into critical habitat
designation would "sabotage the delicate machinery that
Congress designed" to determine the scope of such habitat.23

203. Id. at 1507.
204. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
205. Douglas County 11,48 F.3d at 1503.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1504.
208. See supra note 181.
209. Douglas County 11,48 F.3d at 1506-07.
210. Id. at 1505-06.
211. Id. at 1504 n.10 (citing Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (1981)).
212. Opening Br. of the Fed. Appellants at 31-32, Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M.
v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-2280) (citations
omitted).
213. Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
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In response, Catron County took the FWS to task over displacement
theory. It reiterated its assertion that an irreconcilable statutory conflict is
the only valid grounds for NEPA exemption.214 It then sought to counter the
legislative history the FWS relied on with legislative history that suggested
that Congress did intend for NEPA to apply to critical habitat designation."5
Finally, Catron County argued that the reasoning of Pacific Legal was wholly
inapplicable to critical habitat designation because Pacific Legal did not
employ displacement theory.216
Catron County's arguments proved persuasive, just as they had in
the district court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of
summary judgment.217 In so doing, the court rejected the reasoning of
Douglas County II and repudiated the FWS's (and Ninth Circuit's)
displacement theory, thereby creating a schism drastically affecting
endangered species administration in FWS Region 2. That is, FWS Region
2 includes Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.1 8 Of those, Texas
is in the Fifth Circuit, Arizona is in the Ninth Circuit, and New Mexico and
Oklahoma are in the Tenth Circuit. Thus, from an administrative
standpoint, FWS Region 2 could be under conflicting judicial mandates that
mean critical habitat designations stop at the Texas and Arizona borders.
And in fact, in the wake of the Douglas County II and Catron County
decisions, that is precisely the disposition of the loach minnow and
spikedace critical habitat designations-they end at the Arizona-New
Mexico border.
Nevertheless, the court's rejection of the reasoning of Douglas
County II was total. The court first said that, because it had previously
declined to adopt what it called an "analogous argument" for NEPA
exemption, it was reluctant to do so in this case. 9 Next, the court said that
the "beneficial goal" of habitat preservation was not sufficient to justify
exemption: "[T]hat the Secretary believes the effects of a particular
designation beneficial is... immaterial to his responsibility to comply with
NEPA."- Finally, the court looked at the legislative history of the ESA and

214. Resp. Br. of Appellee Catron County at 13-16, Catron County Bd. of Comr'rs, N.M.
v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-2280) [hereinafter
Resp. Br.]. See supra text accompanying note 190.
215. Resp. Br., supra note 214, at 16-19.
216. Id. at 39-41.
217. Catron County Bd. of Corar'rs, 75 F.3d at 1432.
218. 50 C.F.R. § 2.2 (1997).
219. CatronCounty Bd. of Comm'rs, 75 F.3d at 1436 (citing Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593
(10th Cir. 1972)).
220. Id. at 1437.
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concluded, as Catron County had argued,' that Congress 2intended for
NEPA to apply to the process of critical habitat designation.n
The FWS filed a petition for a rehearing en banc. In it, the FWS
pointed out that the court overlooked an important case in which the circuit
allowed a NEPA exemption based on an argument of functional
equivalence.' The FWS went on to argue that the panel that originally
heard the case reached an incorrect conclusion because it misunderstood the
ESA's critical habitat evaluation criteria.24 Ultimately, however, the court
denied the FWS's request for rehearing.'
V. THEORIES OF NEPA EXEMPTION
As is evident from a discussion of the procedural history of Catron
County, theories of NEPA exemption, and how each party characterized
them, were at issue throughout. While it is possible to get some sense of the
nature and scope of the various theories through a discussion of the case
itself, to understand more fully the context within which Catron County
rests, a thorough examination of the three theories - irreconcilable conflict,
displacement, and functional equivalence-is necessary. Furthermore, a
reasoned critique of Catron County is possible only if one has a better
understanding of the three theories. Each, therefore, is discussed in turn
below. Because functional equivalence provides the strongest argument for
exempting critical habitat designation from the NEPA process, it is
discussed most thoroughly.
A. Irreconcilable Conflict
Throughout the proceedings, Catron County clung to the argument
that the only valid basis for NEPA exemption is when there exists a conflict
between NEPA and an agency's organic statute.t The argument was based
on the notion that, as the only NEPA exemption theory on which the
Supreme Court had yet ruled, irreconcilable conflict theory had exclusive

221. See supra text accompanying note 215.
222. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, 75 F.3d at 1439.
223. Pet. of the Fed. Appellants for Reh'g With Suggestion for Reh'g En Banc at 12, Catron
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-2280) (citing Wyoming v.
Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976)) [hereinafter Pet. for
Reh'g].
224. Id. at 12-14.
225. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No.
94-2280 (10th Cir. Apr. 5,1996) (order denying request for rehearing en banc).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 190, 214.
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validity." The obvious implication of the argument is that because there is
no conflict between NEPA and the ESA, the FWS should, under the
circumstances presented in Catron County, not be exempt from NEPA. To
suggest that an irreconcilable conflict between NEPA and another statute
is the only basis for NEPA exemption, however, is to overstate mattersm
although it is correct to say that irreconcilable conflict theory is wellestablished in NEPA jurisprudence. Because this is true, and because Catron
County raised the issue, even though it proved to be of little importance to
the court's decision," irreconcilable conflict theory bears discussion.
The Supreme Court first articulated irreconcilable conflict theory
in a 1976 case involving the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), a private development company, and an Oklahoma
environmental organization concerned with protecting the Illinois River.
Flint Ridge Development Company v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma °
dealt with whether it is necessary for HUD to prepare an EIS before
Land Sales
allowing a disclosure statement filed pursuant to the Interstate
2
Full Disclosure Act"3 (Disclosure Act) to become effective.?
Under the terms of the Disclosure Act, a developer wishing to sell
for subdivision an unimproved tract of land must file with HUD a
disclosure statement containing certain specified information. 3 The
purpose of the disclosure statement is to inform potential buyers of the state
of the land and its title.? The statement automatically becomes effective 30
days after filing unless the Secretary of HUD determines that it is
incomplete or inaccurate; that is, the developer may sell the land 30 days
after filing the statement, absent some defect in the statement.2 In the event

227. See Resp. Br., supranote 214, at 13 ("The Supreme Court has recognized only one
means by which an agency can avoid compliance with NEPA.'). The argument is true as far
as it goes; that is, irreconcilable conflict theory is the only NEPA exemption theory yet to
reach the Supreme Court. But the argument breaks down when carried to its logical
conclusion. Much of the federal common law would be "invalid" were Supreme Court
rulings on every aspect of it necessary. Furthermore, the suggestion demeans the federal
circuit courts and their respective precedents.
228. In their Reply Brief to the Tenth Circuit, the FWS correctly pointed out that most
circuits, including the Tenth, have adopted other exemption theories. Reply Br. of Fed.
Appellants at 10, Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-2280). The Tenth Circuit also said as much in this
case. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1435-36 (1996).
229. See Catron County Bd. Of Comn'rs, N.M. 75 F.3d at 1435-36.
230. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
231. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1994).
232. See Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 778.

233. 15 U.S.C. § 1705 (1994).
234. See id.
235. See id. at § 1706(a), (b).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

of a defect, HUD simply suspends the effective date until 30 days after the
developer completes or corrects the disclosure statement.'
Based on the non-discretionary 30-day effectiveness requirement,
the Court held that HUD need not comply with the NEPA process. 7 The
Court stated: "It is inconceivable that an environmental impact statement
could, in 30 days, be drafted, circulated, commented upon, and then
reviewed and revised in light of the comments."I In support of this
conclusion the Court cited data from the CEQ indicating that a draft EIS for
a proposal can take anywhere from three to five months to complete, and
that even once the draft EIS is complete, final action on the proposal can be
an additional three months away. 9 Thus, statutory time constraints that
make the preparation of an EIS impossible provide one example of the sort
of conflict that make NEPA exemption appropriate.'
Subsequent to FlintRidge, the Sixth Circuit expanded irreconcilable
conflict theory to include, in addition to conflicts of procedure, conflicts of
purpose. In Pacific Legal, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that to force the FWS to
comply with NEPA when listing species pursuant to the ESA would make
satisfaction of the purposes of both statutes impossible.4 The court found
support for its conclusion in its four-pronged analysis,722 and in the
legislative histories of the two statutes. But underlying the court's
decision was its concern that those opposed to listing decisions might use
NEPA as "an obstructionist tactic" to thwart the listing process.2 Thus, one
might argue that the Sixth Circuit was predisposed to holding as it did.
Nevertheless, the court said the decision was "based on a pure question of
law namely, that a statutory conflict exists between ESA and NEPA which
relieves the Secretary [of Interior] of the burden to prepare an impact
statement before listing any species as endangered or threatened."'"
The FWS subsequently announced that it would no longer
undertake the NEPA process before it listed threatened or endangered
species. It based the new policy in part on a CEQ recommendation and in

236. See id. at § 1706(b).
237. See Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 791.
238. Id. at 788-89.
239. See id. at 789 n.10.
240. See, e.g., Public Citizens v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives, 970 F.2d 916,922
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1986).
241. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835-38 (6th Cir. 1981).
242. See supra note 181.
243. See PacificLegal Found., 657 F.2d at 838-40.
244. See id. at 838.
245. Id. at 841.
246. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Preparation of Environmental
Assessments for Listing Actions Under the Endangered Species Act, 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (1997).
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part on Pacific Legal. 7 As such, the FWS essentially incorporated
irreconcilable conflict theory into its rules for administering the listing
procedures of the ESA.
B. Displacement
Were irreconcilable conflict the only legitimate theory of NEPA
exemption, as Catron County suggested,2 # the Tenth Circuit's analysis
might have been brief. However, because the FWS relied so heavily on
Douglas County II, the Tenth Circuit had to grapple with the Ninth Circuit's
newly articulated displacement theory. The genesis of displacement theory
and its rough contours are set out in the discussion of the procedural history
of the case. 4 What follows are more of the details, as well as some
criticisms of displacement theory.
Displacement theory is the logical extension of an earlier Ninth
Circuit case, Merrell v. Thomas. z Merrell dealt with a challenge to the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) failure to undertake the NEPA
process prior to registering herbicides pursuant to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act"' (FIFRA). In refusing to grant the
plaintiff's request that the EPA be enjoined from continuing to register the
herbicides until it undertake NEPA, the court looked to FIFRA's legislative
history for clues to Congress' intent regarding the interplay of FIFRA and
NEPA. 2' That Congress amended FIFRA's registration procedures shortly
after it enacted NEPA, yet chose not to incorporate NEPA's procedures into
the registration process, was particularly important to the court:
Congress gave no indication [in the amendments] that it
thought NEPA would apply. Instead, Congress created a
registration procedure within FIFRA to ensure consideration
of environmental impact-a procedure that apparently made
NEPA superfluous. Congress also created limited
opportunities for public notice and public participation in
FIFRA's registration procedure. But the 1972 amendments did
not make FIFRA a carbon copy of NEPA. It reflected a
compromise between environmentalists, farmers, and
manufacturers.

247. See id.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 190, 214, and 226.
249. See supra Part W.B.
250. Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
251. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86
Stat. 973 (1972), codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
252. Merrell,807 F.2d at 777-82.
253. Id. at 778.
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In the wake of the 1972 amendments, the EPA interpreted FIFRA
as not requiring NEPA compliance. ' Congress amended FIFRA several
times after 1972 but in so doing never specifically directed the EPA to
comply with NEPA.' The court took this as further evidence of Congress'
intent that NEPA not apply to FIFRA registrations.' Thus, while the court
recognized that there were potential problems with the exemption,25 7 it was
"confident that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply to FIFRA
registrations." ' The Merrell court never used the terms "displace" or
"displacement." Nonetheless, Merrell dearly laid the analytical groundwork
for displacement theory. The theory simply remained nascent until being
brought fully to life in Douglas County I.
In Douglas County II, the court seized the reasoning of Merrell and
applied it to the ESA. It began by examining the legislative history of
amendments to the ESA's critical habitat designation process, as it had the
history of FIFRA's pesticide registration procedures in Merrell.' To the
court it was apparent that Congress intended to introduce "'flexibility' into
the stringent requirements of the ESA" by authorizing the FWS to consider
the economic impacts of critical habitat designations.' The court also
believed that the enhanced notice requirements of the amendments were an
important addition to the ESA.? The court thought that the wider range of
considerations relevant to critical habitat designations and the improved
notice provisions suggested that "[t]he procedure Congress chose, as in
Merrell, ma[de] the NEPA procedure seem'superfluous."''
The court thus
pieced together legislative history to divine whether Congress intended
NEPA to apply to critical habitat designation and concluded that it did
not. 3

254. Id. at 779.

255. Id.
256. Id. In support of its position, the court quoted the maxim "[When Congress revisits
a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent
change, the congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.' Id. (quoting Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
257. Specifically, the court was aware that FIFRA's public participation procedures were
not as substantial as those of NEPA and were thus vulnerable to criticism. Id. at 781.
258. Id.
259. 48 F.3d at 1503-05.
260. Id. at 1503 (citing H.L Conf. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 14 (1978)).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1507. Although the court, having concluded that Congress intended the
procedures of the ESA to displace those of NEPA, could have ended its analysis there, it
found further support for exemption on a pair of alternative grounds. See supra text
accompanying notes 209-11.
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The vitality of displacement theory remains to be seen. Thus far, its
application has been limited to the issues in Merrell and Douglas County II,
respectively, and the resulting exemptions have been narrow. Two
commentators have suggested that displacement is little more than a
dressed-up version of functional equivalence.' But as the Douglas County
II court pointed out, the difference between the two theories is that
displacement is based on congressional intent, whereas functional
equivalence is based on a comparison of procedural requirements.'
Consideration of a statute's procedural requirements is a part of
displacement analysis only to the extent that it gives some initial indication
of congressional intent. " Thus, at least conceivably, a court could grant a
displacement exemption where the procedures of a statute differ
significantly from those of NEPA, as long as there is evidence in the
legislative history of congressional intent that NEPA not apply.
Of course the nearly exclusive reliance on congressional intent may
be displacement theory's biggest weakness, as the diverse holdings of
DouglasCounty II and Catron County demonstrate. Both courts looked at the
legislative history of the 1978 ESA amendments. However, the two courts
chose to focus on different portions of the amendments' congressional
record.267 Based on the portion of the record it chose to focus on, the Catron
County court concluded that Congress did intend for NEPA to apply to
critical habitat designation.2' This indicates just how shaky a foundation
pre-enactment congressional intent provides for displacement theory.
Different courts will inevitably focus on different portions of a statute's
legislative history in deciding on the appropriateness or inappropriateness
of a displacement exemption. In contrast, the analysis can be much more
objective where courts are merely asked, in effect, to lay two statutes sideby-side and decide whether their procedures are equivalent.

264. See Erika Johnson, Note, Douglas County v. Babbitt and the New Displacement
Exemption; NEPA Loses More Ground, 17 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L, REV. 177,194-95 (1996);
Melaney Payne, Note, CriticallyAcclaimed But Not CriticallyFollowed - The Inapplicabilityof
the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act to FederalAgency Actions: Douglas County v. Babbitt, 7
VILL. ENVTL L.J. 339,368-74 (1996).

265. Douglas County 11, 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10.
266. See id. at 1502-05.
267. Compare Douglas County 11, 48 F.3d at 1503 with Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. 75 F.3d 1429,1439 (10th Cir. 1996).
268. CatronCounty, 75 F.3d at 1439 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804, at 27 (1978)). That
the two courts chose to cite different portions of the legislative history of the amendments
further illustrates the weakness of relying too heavily on legislative history or congressional
intent.
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C. Functional Equivalence
Always on the fringes of the debate over NEPA exemption in
Catron County's suit was a third theory of NEPA exemption-functional
equivalence. Recall that early in the administrative proceeding, when
Phelps Dodge Corporation suggested that it believed the FWS was bound
to go through the NEPA process during critical habitat designation, the
FWS's official response was that it believed the procedures of the ESA were
the functional equivalent of the NEPA process.' Recall, too, that both the
Douglas County I' and Douglas County IF courts hinted that functional
equivalence theory might be a viable theory of NEPA exemption in that
case. Curiously, though, the FWS opted not to argue functional equivalence
as an alternative to displacement theory in CatronCounty. What follows are
discussions of the development and application of functional equivalence
theory in its various forms, both without and within the Tenth Circuit.
1. The History of FunctionalEquivalence
The first clear statement of functional equivalence theory was in
PortlandCement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus.m Cement manufacturers asked the
D.C. Circuit to decide whether it was necessary for the EPA to prepare an
EIS before promulgating pollution standards for portland cement plants
pursuant to the Clean Air Actm (CAA). The cement manufacturers argued
that NEPA was clear: all federal agencies must file EISs; the EPA is a federal

269. See supra text accompanying notes 168-75. Curiously, the FWS raised functional
equivalence only once, in passing, during the course of the entire legal proceedings. See Pet.
for Reh'g, supra note 223, at 12.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
271. See supra text accompanying note 211.
272. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Administrator E.P.A., 417 U.S. 921 (1974). One might actually trace the roots of functional
equivalence to earlier cases. For example, the D.C. Circuit, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), said of the
NEPA process: "Of course, consideration [of environmental factors) which is entirely
duplicative is not necessarily required.' Id. at 1118. Just prior to the PortlandCement decision,
the Fourth Circuit granted a broad exemption from NEPA compliance to the EPA in a case
involving section 107 of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). Finally, the Third Circuit, in a case involving
the EPA's adoption of state pollution control standards, suggested that the CAA contained
procedures that are functionally equivalent to those of NEPA: "It is apparent that the Clean
Air Act contains sufficient provisions for the achievement of those goals sought to be
attained by NEPA.' Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (3d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied,409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The D.C. Circuit relied on all three of these cases
in making its decision in PortlandCement. See generally PortlandCement, 486 F.2d 375.
273.

PortlandCement, 486 F.2d at 377-78. The Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§

7401-31 (1994).

Spring 19981

FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE

agency; therefore the EPA must file an EIS before promulgating pollution
standards.' 4 Although recognizing that the argument had some merit, the
court called it "more simplistic than simple."m The court then embarked on
an analysis of the statutory standards of both the CAA and NEPA. It listed
the procedures the CAA requires of the EPA in adopting pollution
standards, which include notice and comment provisions and
environmental consideration&" The court then looked to the purposes of
NEPA to try to discern whether those purposes are met by the procedural
requirements of the CAA, which the court concluded they are.' Arguing
that "[a]n impact statement requirement [would] present[ ] the danger that
opponents of environmental protection would use the issue of compliance
with any impact statement requirement as a tactic of litigation and delay,"
the court carved out a narrow exemption to NEPA compliance.m The court
concluded: "What is decisive, ultimately, is the reality that, section 111 of
the Clean Air Act, properly construed, requires the functional equivalent of
a NEPA impact statement."' Following PortlandCement, NEPA exemption
from CAA decisions became standard.' Congress subsequently amended
the CAA to include the PortlandCement exemption.'
Decisions relying on, or containing logic similar to, PortlandCement,
but involving statutes other than the CAA, soon began to appear. Courts
began to expand accordingly the narrow exemption granted in Portland
Cement, thus refining functional equivalence theory. Among the courts
leading the move toward expansion was the D.C. Circuit itself. In the same
year it decided PortlandCement, the D.C. Circuit applied the same reasoning
to exempt the EPA from NEPA when making registration decisions
pursuant to FIFRA. In EnvironmentalDefense Fundv. EnvironmentalProtection
Agency,"m the court argued that the PortlandCement rationale was applicable
to the EPA's decision to cancel certain pesticide registrations, and that an

274.
275.
276.

PortlandCement, 486 F.2d at 379.
Id.
Id. at 380.

277. Id. at 381-84.
278. Id. at 384. The court reiterated the narrowness of its holding later in the opinion:
"We add, finally, a word of clarification: we establish a narrow exemption from NEPA, for
EPA determinations under section 111 of the Clean Air Act.' Id. at 387.
279. Id.
280. See Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 509 F.2d
839 (7th Cir. 1975); Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 481 P.2d 162 (6th Cir.
1973), appeal after remand, Big Rivers Elec. Coop. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 523

F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
281. 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1994).
282. 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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exemption was therefore appropriate.3 The court wanted to be sure that
what it referred to as "the five core NEPA issues"-1) the action's
environmental impact; 2) its potential adverse environmental effects; 3)
alternatives to the action; 4) the interplay between long-term and short-term
land uses and the action's goals; and 5) irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources brought about by the action-were met before
it granted an exemption.'
Regarding FIFRA's registration procedures, the court reasoned:
The explicit language in FIFRA requires that pesticides be
deregistered if they will be injurious to man and his
environment. The substantive standard established by the
statute places great emphasis on the quality of man's
environment. Additionally, the procedural standards provide
full opportunity for thorough consideration of the
environmental issues, and for ample judicial review.2
In granting the exemption, the court pointed out, as it had in Portland
Cement, that the exemption was a narrow one, stating it was "not
formulating a broad exemption from NEPA for all environmental agencies
or even for all environmentally protective regulatory actions of such
agencies," but instead that it was "delineat[ing] a narrow exemption from
the literal requirements for those actions which are undertaken pursuant to
sufficient safeguards so that the purpose and policies behind NEPA will
necessarily be fulfilled."' Since Environmental Defense Fund, courts have
granted functional equivalence exemptions for EPA actions pursuant to a
variety of other statutes.' The focus of the analyses has been on whether
the organic statute provides procedures sufficiently similar to the NEPA
process to grant an exemption. This is the fundamental meaning of
functional equivalence.

283. Id. at 1256.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1257. Note that the case is similar to Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.
1986), in that both involved exemptions for the FIFRA registration process. The difference
is that the Merrell court expressly opted not to apply functional equivalence, focusing instead
on congressional intent for exemption. See Merrell, 807 F.2d at 781. See also supra text
accompanying notes 250-58.
287. See Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
911 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1990) (exempting the issuance of Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act hazardous waste management facility permits from NEPA); Warren County
v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981) and Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F.
Supp. 778 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (exempting the EPA from the NEPA process when acting under
the Toxic Substances Control Act); Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116 (D. Md. 1976)
(exempting the EPA from the NEPA process when issuing dumping permits pursuant to the
Ocean Dumping Act).
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Courts have yet to define the full scope of functional equivalence.
To date, only the EPA has received functional equivalence exemptions for
its actions, although the reasons for this are not clear. In one instance, the
Fifth Circuit, in rejecting a Forest Service claim that it followed procedures
functionally equivalent to the NEPA process when it developed a timber
harvesting plan for Texas forests, said that functional equivalence
exemptions "have generally been limited to environmental agencies
themselves."' The court explained that "[u]nlike an agency whose sole
responsibility is to protect the environment, the Forest Service is charged
with the management of the nation's timber resour ....
[It] must balance
environmental and economic needs in managing the nation's timber
supply."'
Without arguing the merits of the decision, the Fifth Circuit's
rationale is misleading. It suggests, among other things, that the EPA does
not consider economics when it makes its decisions, which clearly is
incorrect. For example, FIFRA specifically directs the EPA to consider
economics when it cancels a pesticide registration.' In addition, that the
EPA is so far the only agency to have received functional equivalence
exemptions is partly an artifact; attempts by other agencies to receive
functional equivalence exemptions have been few." When the D.C. Circuit
first articulated the theory it gave no indication that it believed functional
equivalence exemptions should be limited to the actions of the EPA.m There
is thus no reason for courts to deny functional equivalence exemptions to
the actions of other agencies when the facts support exemption.

288. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 208 (5th Cir. 1978),
reh'g denied, 576 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978) (citing
Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir.

1973)).
289. Id.
290. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(2) (1994) ('In taking any final action under this subsection, the
Administrator shall consider restricting a pesticide's use or uses as an alternative to
cancellation... and shall include among those factors to be taken into account the impact
of such final action on... the agricultural economy.... ).
291. Bergland is the only case in which the Forest Service has sought a functional
equivalence exemption for any of its actions. Similarly, there has only been one instance in
which the Bureau of Land Management has argued for, and been denied, a functional

equivalence exemption. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
292. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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2. Functional Equivalencein the Tenth Circuit
Notwithstanding the court's suggestion to the contrary in Catron
County,'m the Tenth Circuit has recognized functional equivalence as a valid
basis for NEPA exemption. In fact, the Tenth Circuit has a noteworthy
history, which the Catron County court overlooked entirely, of applying
functional equivalence theory in various circumstances. What follows is a
brief summary of Tenth Circuit functional equivalence cases which suggests
that functional equivalence analysis would have been appropriate in Catron
County.
Early on, the Tenth Circuit wrote approvingly of the reasoning of
PortlandCement.-' Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus involved a challenge by a
Montana mining company to the EPA's proposed sulfur oxide emissions
control standards promulgated pursuant to the CAA.'m The EPA did not
prepare an EIS before proposing the regulations, prompting Anaconda to
sue for a violation of NEPA The case, therefore, bore a close resemblance
to Portland Cement. The court did not actually reach the issue of NEPA
compliance because it ruled that the district court improperly exercised
jurisdiction over the case.' Just the same, the court discussed the merits of
Anaconda's claim cursorily, suggesting that, had the issue properly been
before it, the court would have granted an exemption. Citing Portland
Cement, the court said "[tihe important point.., is that the EPA's sole
mission is to improve the quality of the human environment. To compel the
filing of impact statements could only serve to frustrate the accomplishment
of [NEPA's] objectives."' m With Anaconda, the Tenth Circuit made it clear
that it was willing at least to entertain theories of NEPA exemption where
appropriate.
Two years after Anaconda, the Tenth Circuit decided its next
important functional equivalence case, Wyoming v. Hathaway.2 That the
Catron County court failed to discuss Hathaway is particularly surprising in
that, not only is it the Tenth Circuit's leading functional equivalence case,
it is one of the most frequently-discussed functional equivalence cases from

293. Catron County Bd. of Conun'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429,
1436 (10th Cir. 19%).
294. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
295. Id. at 1302-03.
296. Id. at 1303.
297. Id. at 1305.
298. Id. at 1305-06.
299. 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
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any circuit. It involved a challenge by the State of Wyoming to the EPA's
suspension of the registrations of several commercially available coyote
poisons without first having undertaken the NEPA process.3 In deciding
whether to grant an exemption, the court considered several factors. Of
concern to the court was the threat the continued use of the poisons posed
to endangered species.m However, the question of exemption turned on the
administrative record and on HFRA's procedural safeguards.' On the
basis of these, the court held that the EPA was not required to prepare an
EIS, stating:
The impact statement is merely an implement devised by
Congress to require government agencies to think about and
weigh environmental factors before acting. Considered in this
light, an organization like EPA whose regulatory activities are
necessarily concerned with environmental consequences need
not stop in the middle of its proceedings in order to issue a
separate and distinct impact statement just to be issuing it. To
so require would decrease environmental protection activity
rather than increase it.3"
A few things stand out about Hathaway. First, by saying that an
agency "like EPA... need not stop in the middle of its proceedings,"' the
court apparently meant to imply that functional equivalence exemptions
could be extended to other agencies. In other words, had the court meant
to limit functional equivalence exemptions to the EPA it could simply have

300. See, e.g., Howard Geneslaw, Cleanup of the National PrioritiesList Sites, Functional
Equivalence and the NEPA Environmental Impact Statement, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L 127,
137-39 (1994); L. Diane Schenke & Sharon Shutler, The Application of NEPA to Restoration
Plans Under the Oil PollutionAct, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 345, 352 (1993); Sandra P. Montrose,
Comment, To Police the Police: FunctionalEquivalence to the EIS Requirement and EPA Remedial
Actions Under Superfund, 33 CATH. U. L REV. 863 (1984).
301. 525 F.2d at 67.
302. Noting that several eagles had been found dead from ingesting some of the poison,
the court stated:
The prairies and ranges are populated by numerous animals, some of
which are becoming rare. At jeopardy are potentially endangered species.
Each death to that population is an irremediable loss and renders such
species closer to extinction. No apparent circumstances exist to
counterbalance this distinct hazard and suggest that the possibility of
irremediable loss is outweighed by the harm that must occur from their
[the poisons') non-availability during a period of suspension.
Id. at 68 n.2.
The court's concern with the welfare of endangered species in Hathaway adds a
certain irony to its decision in Catron County.
303. Id. at 68-73.
304. Id. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).
305. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
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said the EPA "need not stop in the middle of its proceedings." Second, and
more important, the court appears to have redefined functional equivalence
to apply to the facts of a specific case, rather than applying only where there
are procedural similarities between NEPA and the statute in question.'
Because of Hathaway's similarity to Environmental Defense Fund v.
Environmental ProtectionAgency, the court could simply have adopted the
holding of Environmental Defense Fund and declared FIFRA registration
decisions to be exempt from NEPA.w Instead the court focused on the
administrative record, especially the EPA's reliance on a study known as
the "Cain Report."
The court's own language supports the proposition that Hathaway
was an example of a more liberal, case-specific application of functional
equivalence. For example, the court said "whether the EPA is forever and
under all circumstances exempt from filing an environmental impact
statement is not here being decided. Under the circumstancespresented,it was
clearly unnecessary for such a statement to be filed. " " Similarly, the court
stated that " [t]he study andfactual development which the Administratorpursued
satisfied the standards of the Act of Congress [i.e., NEPA]. It was in our
view a substantial equivalent to the statutory impact statement. " 3 If
Hathawaycan rightly be said to be an example of a case-specific functional

306. Noting the case-specific nature of the court's analysis, and the court's concern with
the threat to endangered species, some commentators have argued that Hathawaystands for
the proposition that emergency situations may give rise to the granting of a functional
equivalence exemption. See Geneslaw, supra note 300, at 139; Montrose, supra note 300, at
878-80. This may overstate the emphasis the court placed on the potential danger to
endangered species, however, in that the threat to endangered species figured only
marginally in the court's analysis. See 525 F.2d at 69.
307. 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also supra text accompanying notes 282-87.
Ironically, Hathaway's case-specific functional equivalence exemption might be traced to
Environmental Defense Fund itself. In theory, once a court determines that a substantive
statute such as FIFRA contains procedural safeguards that are the functional equivalent of
NEPA, as the Environmental Defense Fundcourt did, it need not inquire further. Even though
the EnvironmentalDefense Fundcourt adopted the statutory comparison standard of Portland
Cement, however, it further supported its decision with a discussion of the actions the EPA
took leading up to its suspension order: "On review of the decision and Order of the EPA
Administrator, we find it to be supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a
whole. Furthermore, we find that EPA has provided the functional equivalent of a formal
NEPA report." 489 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis added).
308. Hathaway,525 F.2d at 69. The Cain Report is a summary from the early 1970s of the
then-current predator control methods being used on federal public lands. It is called the
"Cain Report" in honor of the chairman of the group that prepared it, Professor Stanley A.
Cain. See UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON PREDATOR CONTROL, PREDATOR
CONTROL-1971: RErORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR (1972) [hereinafter CAIN REPORT].
309. 525 F.2d at 72 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).

Spring 19981

FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE

equivalence exemption, it would have been highly relevant precedent for
the court to consider in Catron County.
The suggestion that Hathawayis an example of a more liberal, casespecific application of functional equivalence theory is further strengthened
by a later Tenth Circuit case, Sierra Club v. Hodel.311 Hodel involved a
challenge by environmental groups to a Garfield County, Utah, proposal to
improve a county road, known as the Burr Trail, adjacent to certain
wilderness study areas (WSAs). 2 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
had management responsibility for the WSAs, but refused to exercise
control over the county's project.P3 One of the issues was whether the BLM
had a responsibility under NEPA to make sure that the area environment
receive 314adequate consideration before the county initiated the road
project.
The county and the BLM argued that the BLM's preparation of
several earlier environmental studies for the area satisfied NEPA's
requirements.31s The studies to which the county and the BLM referred were
in fact NEPA documents the BLM had prepared for other projects. 316
Nevertheless, the court rejected the BLM's functional equivalence
argument.O'7 It acknowledged that it had previously "permitted a related
study to serve as the functional equivalent of an EIS, when the other study
was 'very similar in objectives and in content to an environmental impact
statement."'3 8 Stated otherwise, an earlier study may serve as the functional
equivalent of a NEPA study if: 1) the earlier study's underlying purpose, or
objective, was substantially similar to that of the proposed action for which

311. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Village of Los
Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
312. Id. at 1073.
313. Id. at 1074.
314. Id. at 1073.
315. Id. at 1094.
316. Id. at 1095-96.
317. Id. at 1095.
318. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66,72 (10th ir. 1975), cert. denied,426
U.S. 906 (1976)). The Hodel court never specifically said that an agency must satisfy NEPA's
public input requirements before it can receive a functional equivalence exemption, but that
is implicit in the court's statement that in order to serve as the functional equivalent a study
must be "similar in content to an EIS. Moreover, that would be in keeping with Hathaway,
where the court based its decision in part on the plaintiff's having been afforded an
opportunity to participate in the EPA's decision. 525 F.2d 66, 70 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 906 (1976).
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the NEPA process would otherwise be necessary;319 and 2) the contents of
the previous study approximate the contents of an EIS.
After applying the foregoing criteria to the studies the BLM relied
on, the Hodel court refused to grant a functional equivalence exemption. The
court said the studies suffered from "two overlapping weaknesses:
insufficiently detailed discussion of environmental impacts, and the absence
of a demonstrated close fit between the County's proposal and the [earlier]
study's [sic] Burr Trail proposal."3' By "absence of a demonstrated close
fit" the court meant that the Burr Trail figured only marginally in the
previous studies.' Thus, the purposes behind the earlier NEPA studies
were too dissimilar from the purpose behind the proposal at issue. That the
previous studies were NEPA studies highlights the emphasis on content
over form central to case-specific functional equivalence analysis. Despite
the court's rejection of the BLM's argument, the Hodelanalysis would
clearly have been relevant to the issue in Caron County, as would the
Hathawayanalysis. The Caron County court cited Hodd only once, however,
for the general proposition that NEPA is intended to make environmental
considerations a part of agency decision making, and to inform the public
that environmental concerns have been a part of pending agency
decisions.'2'
VI. THE APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE TO
THE DESIGNATION OF CRITICAL HABITAT
The Caron County court had available to it two functional
equivalence models within which to analyze the question of NEPA
compliance and the designation of critical habitat for the loach minnow and
the spikedace. It could have applied either its own case-specific model or
the more traditional statutory comparison model, but it chose to disregard

319. Conceivably, the purposes could be identical. That is, an agency could have
conducted a study merely for the purpose of gathering information, without any proposed

action in mind, and then later propose the sort of action that was analyzed in the original
study. Arguably, that was the case in Hathaway. The Cain Report was prepared without
reference to the curtailment of the use of any specific predacide. See CAIN REPORT, supra note
308, at 5-114. However, one of the purposes of the report was to determine which aspects
of the country's predator control program, including the use of predacides, were posing an
unusually great risk to non-target species. See id. at 1-4. When the EPA later moved to
restrict the use of strychnine, its purpose in doing so was to lessen the mortality of nontarget, endangered species that was resulting from predator control efforts. See 525 F.2d at
68-69.

320. 848 F.2d at 1096.
321. Id.at 1095-96.
322. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 75
F.3d 1429,1434 (10th Cir. 1996).
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both. As the following discussion suggests, application of either model
might have led to a different outcome.
A.

The Case-Specific Model

A case-specific exemption would have required a showing by the
FWS that it had already performed a detailed analysis of the environmental
impacts of critical habitat designation for the loach minnow and the
spikedace, and that in so doing, it had gathered and presented the data in
a manner consistent with the preparation of an EIS. That the FWS did meet
these requirements is best demonstrated by comparing the administrative
record the FWS amassed in satisfaction of the ESA's listing procedures for
the loach minnow and the spikedace to the Cain Report, the study for which
the Tenth Circuit granted an exemption in Wyoming v. Hathaway.3'
The Cain Report, which the CEQ and the Department of the Interior
commissioned jointly, was a summary of predator control methods and
their risks.324 In all, it included fifteen recommendations, along with
supporting discussions, of ways to improve the nation's predator control
programs.' Among the recommendations were the establishment of a
livestock insurance program,3m the abolition of predator control in
wilderness areas,3' and the establishment of a long-term, comprehensive
research program to study the range of effects of predator control
programs.32 The Cain Report's authors based their recommendations not
on field studies they themselves had performed, but on a summary of
available literature dealing with predator control programs, much of which
3
appears to have been singular, species-specific studies. 2
Although broad in scope, the Cain Report is fairly brief at just over
200 pages.' Not surprisingly, therefore, the Cain Report's authors did not
treat any single topic particularly comprehensively. In the judgment of the
Hathawaycourt, the "mainemphasis" of the Cain Report was the threat to
endangered species from the continued indiscriminate use of commercial
poisons.3 1 Certainly, the protection of endangered species figures

323. 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); see also supra text
accompanying notes 303-10.
324. See CAIN REPORT, supranote 308, at 1-4.
325. Id. at 5-114.
326. Id. at 7-8.
327. Id. at 9.
328. Id. at 11-12.
329. Id. at 115-19.
330.
331.

See id.
525 F.2d at 69.
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prominently among the fifteen recommendations in the Cain Report. 33 Even
so, the authors only discussed the effects of predator control programs on
the populations of a handful of threatened and endangered species, and
only in very broad terms.' For example, the following is an excerpt from
the authors' discussion of the threat of predator control programs to the
highly endangered black-footed ferret:
The hazard to the ferret is through the prairie dog control
programs. The ferret is very rare and secretive, so the true
impact of the prairie dog poisoning is hard to assess. The
potential for secondary poisoning is clearly present.
Elimination of the prairie dogs as a food supply could be
equally fatal, through starvation, if the ferret is really highly
dependent on them. Great changes in land use may also have
an effect?
Although the authors discussed more thoroughly the effects of predator
control efforts on some species, the foregoing is typical of the depth of the
study's environmental analysis.3
The consideration of environmental impacts is, of course, not
enough to justify a functional equivalence exemption. As noted, an agency
must also, in some measure, satisfy NEPA's public input requirements for
exemption to be appropriate. 3' It took some creativity for the Hathaway
court to conclude that the EPA satisfied these requirements. While it is true
that the authors of the Cain Report, as part of the preparation process,
sought comments from nearly 400 people, 7 there is no indication that they
solicited comments from the public at large. Indeed, the court had to look
beyond the Cain Report to find evidence that the public had had an
opportunity to participate in the EPA's decision to suspend the registration
of strychnine. What the court found were provisions for public input in
FIFRA, the statute pursuant to which the EPA suspended the
registrations.m This strange aggregation of sources-the Cain Report and
FIFRA's input procedures-although seemingly a far cry from the sort of
direct public access to agency decision making NEPA contemplates, was
enough, in the court's judgment, to "satisf[y the standards of the Act of
Congress [i.e., NEPAJ. "' 39 Thus, despite shortcomings both in the

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See, CAIN REPORT, supra note 308, at 13-14, 82-89.
Id.
Id. at 86.
See id. at 82-89.
See supranote 318 and accompanying text.
See CAIN REPORT, supra note 308, at 197-207.
525 F.2d at 70.
Id. at 73.
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consideration of environmental impacts and in the public's access to the
process, the court granted an exemption.'
Measured against the Hathaway standard, the argument for a
functional equivalence exemption for the designation of critical habitat for
the loach minnow and the spikedace is strong. First, the FWS's recognition
of the environmental impacts of designating critical habitat for the loach
minnow and the spikedace was far more comprehensive than the EPA's
recognition, through its reliance on the findings of the Cain Report, of the
environmental impacts of cancelling the registration for strychnine. Rather
than identifying and analyzing possible environmental impacts generally,
as did the authors of the Cain Reporte ' (and by extension the EPA), the
FWS took into account a variety of very specific impacts. This is true in part
because the FWS, in addressing environmental concerns, had to respond to
public questions and comments regarding the designations. So for example,
before designating critical habitat for the spikedace, the FWS considered the
effects of designation on streambank stability throughout the watershed. 2
It also considered whether the need for critical habitat could be reduced
through stocking of captive-reared fish, I and the effects of designation on
past species listings.-" Of course, the FWS went even further, considering
the impact of the designations on the human environment; that is, the
impact on activities such as local agriculture.' The authors of the Cain
Report considered similar impacts,' but in much less detail than did the
FWS.
The opportunity for public input was also much greater in the
critical habitat designation process than it had been in Hathaway. Rather
than being satisfied that the public could have involved itself in the process,
as was true in Hathaway 7 the FWS actively sought input.? That the FWS
sought input because required to do so by the ESAM does not lessen the
significance of the opportunity the FWS afforded the public. In sun, the
court should have recognized the comprehensive administrative record in
this case for what it is: a study "very similar in objectives and in content to

340. Id.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 330-35.
342. Spikedace Designation, supra note 81, at 10,908.
343. Id. at 10,909-10.
344. Id. at 10,910-11.
345. See, e.g., SOUDER REPORT II, supra note 93.
346. See CAIN REPORT, supra note 308, at 24-29.
347. See 525 F.2d 66, 70 (The court concluded that rather than being deprived of an
opportunity to provide input into the EPA's decision, the plaintiffs 'chose not to utilize'
FIPRA's comment and review provisions.).
348. See supra Part ILC.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
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an environmental statement." ° As such, it would have been in keeping
with Hathaway for the court to have granted the FWS a case-specific
exemption for the designation of critical habitat for the loach minnow and
the spikedace.sl
B. The Statutory Comparison Model
The grounds for granting the FWS a case-specific exemption from
NEPA regarding the designation of critical habitat for the loach minnow
and the spikedace are clear. However, there is also a strong argument that
a permanent exemption should be carved out for all critical habitat
designations, based on the longstanding, statutory comparison model of
functional equivalence analysis. A permanent exemption would serve as a
lasting solution to what appears to be an emerging problem in ESA
administration in the wake of the split between the Ninth and Tenth circuits
following Douglas County II and Catron County. It would involve a
determination that the ESA's procedures for designating critical habitat of

350. Hathaway, 525 F.2d at 72.
351. The court's failure may be attributable to the fact that the FWS never pointed to
Hathaway functional equivalence directly. The first time the FWS mentioned Hathaway in any
of its pleadings was in its Petition for Rehearing, where it pointed out that the court had
been incorrect when it said that conflict theory was the only NEPA exemption theory the
Tenth Circuit had recognized:
In this case the federal appellants argued that the ESA prescribed
procedures and standards for assessing the effects of a critical habitat
designation, and that Douglas County recognized that this took the place of
NEPA compliance. The panel rejected this argument, stating that it could
not follow DouglasCounty because circuit precedent ...limits exceptions
to NEPA compliance to federal actions under statutes that are "mutually
exclusive" with NEPA.
This is simply a misreading of [circuit precedent]... Indeed, this Court
has recognized that "mutually exclusive" statutes were not the only means
for finding that NEPA did not apply to a class of federal agency
determinations. In State of Wyoming v.Hathaway, this Court held that EPA
need not comply with NEPA in administering an environmental protection
statute because the statute's standards and procedures were the "functional
equivalent of NEPA.' While the panel here acknowledged that other courts
followed the functional equivalency doctrine, it failed to acknowledge this
Court's adoption of that doctrine in State of Wyoming. As a result, the
panel's conclusion that circuit precedent precludes a holding NEPA is
inapplicable to ESA critical habitat determinations misreads [circuit
precedent) and conflicts with State ofWyoming.
Pet. for Reh'g, supra note 223, at 11-12. Rather than following that with a vigorous
argument for a functional equivalence exemption for the loach minnow and spikedace
critical habitat designations, however, the FWS simply argued that it thought the court
misunderstood displacement theory and should therefore order a rehearing. Id. at 12-14.
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the ESA are functionally equivalent to NEPA's environmantal analysis and
public input procedures.
Several commentators have expressed opinions as to the functional
equivalence of the ESA's critical habitat designation procedures to the
NEPA process. They have each compared the ESA's procedures directly
with NEPA's, and have reached varying conclusions on the applicability of
functional equivalence.5 2 One can make a perhaps more compelling
argument, however, by analogizing the ESA's procedures to those of a
statute that courts have held satisfy the criteria for exemption.
The procedures of all of the statutes for which courts have allowed
exemptions differ from NEPA's to a greater or lesser degree. That the ESA's
procedures likewise differ from NEPA's is a given. What one gains,
however, by analogizing the ESA's procedures to those of a statute for
which other courts have granted exemption is insight into the amount of
allowable deviation from NEPA. Because it was one of the first statutes for
which a court granted a functional equivalence exemption,' and because
it has been the focus of exemption analysis in a number of courtsm FIFRA
serves as a useful statute to which to analogize. The following discussion
draws on leading FIFRA exemption cases, and on the language of FIFRA
and its implementing regulations in arguing that the ESA's critical habitat
designation procedures satisfy the criteria for a functional equivalence
exemption.
First recall that for a statute to garner a functional equivalence
exemption its procedures must satisfy the "five core NEPA issues."' That
is, they must: provide for adequate consideration of an action's
environmental impacts; require an agency to consider the potential adverse
environmental effects of an action; allow for the consideration of
alternatives to an action; cause the agency to evaluate the effects an action
has on both long-term and short-term land uses and goals; and, force the
agency to consider irretrievable commitments of financial resources before

352. Jean M. Emery, Note, EnvironmentalImpact Statements and CriticalHabitat:Does NEPA
Apply to the Designation of CriticalHabitat Under the Endangered Species Act?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
973, 1002-05 (1996) (concluding that the procedures are functionally equivalent); Payne,
supra note 264 (concluding that the procedures are functionally equivalent); David G. Perillo,
Note, Designationsof Critical Habitat Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act: Does NEPA
Apply?, 7 FORDHAM Ex~vm. L.J. 397, 435-36 (1996) (concluding that the procedures are not
functionally equivalent).
353. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d 1247

(D.C. Cir. 1973).
354. In addition to the D.C. Circuit, both the Ninth Circuit, see Merrell v. Thomas, 807
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 US. 848 (1987), and the Tenth Circuit, see Wyoming
v. Hathaway. 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976), have addressed
the issue of NEPA exemption for FIFRA actions.
355. EnvironmentalDefense Fund, 489 F.2d at 1256.
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undertaking the action. 6' It is also important for the statute to provide for
public input regarding agency decisions.3 '
FIFRA satisfies these requirements through a variety of procedures.
It allows the EPA to suspend or cancel a pesticide registration if it appears
that the continued use of the pesticide would cause "unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment."' It encourages the EPA, before canceling a
registration, to consider the possible effects of cancellation on "prices of
agricultural commodities," "retail food prices," and "the agricultural
economy."' It also mandates that the EPA consider whether restrictions on
use might serve as a workable alternative to complete cancellation.'
Finally, it encourages, but does not require, the EPA to seek public input on
any proposal before making a final decision on cancellation. 61
As the foregoing brief summary of FIFRA's procedures illustrates,
some of the "core NEPA issues" are more clearly satisfied than are others.
For example, the EPA has only minimal discretion to consider alternatives
to cancellation.m No doubt that is because of the importance of expeditious
action when a pesticide is found to be hazardous. Nevertheless, the limited
consideration of alternatives marks a point of departure from NEPA 63 A
larger point of departure is, as noted, the EPA's discretion in seeking public
input prior to canceling a registration. One of NEPA's principal aims, after
all, is to keep the public informed about agency actions that might affect the
environment.-" However, because FIFRA's "substantive standard[s] ...
place great emphasis on the quality of man's environment... [and] ...
provide full opportunity for thorough consideration of the environmental
issues,"m NEPA exemption is the rule.
The ESA's critical habitat designation procedures are, in several
respects, very much like FIFRA's pesticide cancellation procedures. As such,
they satisfy the "five core NEPA issues," and therefore warrant a functional
equivalence exemption. That the FWS must evaluate the impact of
designation on the environment is clear. When it designates critical habitat
for a listed species, the FWS is to "consider those physical and biological

356. Id.
357. See Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d at 70.
358. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1994).
359. Id. at § 136d(b)(2).
360. Id.
361. Id. at § 136d(b); see also § 136d(f)(2).
362. See id. § 136d(b)(2).
363. See Environmental Impact Statement Rules, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1997) (describing
the scope of alternatives an EIS is to include).
364. See supra text accompanying note 150.
365. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d 1247
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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features that are essential to the [species'] conservation."3 It is to base
designation primarily on "the best scientific and commercial data
available."'6 But because the "environment" encompasses both areas
inhabited primarily by listed species and those inhabited primarily by man,
the ESA directs the FWS to "tak[e ] into consideration the probable economic
and other impacts" of designation. " This latter requirement allows the FWS
not only to consider the potential adverse effects of its action, but also to
address the issue of irretrievable commitments of financial resources. In
addition, the opportunity for public input throughout the designation
process is considerable. At every step of the process, the FWS has a nondiscretionary duty to inform the public and seek comment.' The
opportunity for public
input goes even further; a single request necessitates
370
a public hearing.
Perhaps the only weakness in arguing that the ESA's designation
procedures are functionally equivalent to the NEPA process is that the FWS
has limited discretion to consider alternatives to designation. As noted,
though, the same is true of the EPA's discretion to consider alternatives to
the cancellation of pesticide registrations pursuant to FIFRA.37' In fact, the
FWS has far more discretion to consider alternatives to critical habitat
designation than does the EPA to consider alternatives to pesticide
cancellation. The FWS may exclude a particular area from designation if it
believes the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of inclusion.3'
Furthermore, the FWS may, under certain circumstances, choose not to
designate critical habitat at all.3' In all other respects, the critical habitat
designation process is every bit the functional equivalent of the NEPA
process and worthy of exemption.

366. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 50
C.F.R. § 424.12(b) (1997).

367. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994).
368. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 50
C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (1997); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (1997).
369. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(5), (6) (1994); Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and
Designating Critical Habitat, 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.16,424.18 (1997).
370. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(E) (1994); Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and
Designating Critical Habitat, 50 C.Y.R. §424.16(c)(3) (1997).
371. See supra text accompanying note 362.
372. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
373. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 50
C.F.R. § 424.14(a)(1) (1997)(allowing the FWS to refrain from designating critical habitat
when doing so would pose a threat to the species or would not be beneficial to the species).
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CONCLUSION
When the FWS began the process of listing the loach minnow and
the spikedace, and subsequently of designating critical habitat for the two,
it could not have anticipated what lay ahead. Today, legal challenges
involving the FWS and its administration of the ESA are common, but in
1982, when the FWS began listing the process for the loach minnow and the
spikedace, such challenges were much less common. In 1982, the FWS could
not have foreseen the sort of scrutiny the designating of critical habitat for
the loach minnow and the spikedace would receive. It could not have
foreseen that a challenge from a sparsely populated area like Catron
County, New Mexico, would bring one segment of the FWS's
administration of the ESA to a near standstill, at least in parts of the
country. However, such is the whimsy of the administrative process.
Since Catron County, FWS offices that fall within the jurisdiction of
the Tenth Circuit must, before designating critical habitat for threatened
and endangered species, satisfy NEPA's procedures in addition to
satisfying the ESA's comprehensive and very similar procedures. While it
may seem strange even to question the wisdom of requiring an
administrative agency to follow one of Congress' mandates, there is a long
history of courts, including the Supreme Court, granting agencies
exemptions from NEPA in appropriate circumstances. Beginning with
irreconcilable conflict theory, ending with the Ninth Circuit's recently
articulated displacement theory, and including, of course, functional
equivalence theory, courts have sought to give effect to NEPA's spirit
without requiring slavish adherence to its letter. Catron County signals the
Tenth Circuit's unwillingness-albeit present unwillingness-to permit
agencies to deviate from NEPA, even in the face of a statute whose
procedures are equivalent to NEPA's. The immediate result is an added
administrative burden for the FWS.
The FWS need not have been saddled with the added
administrative burden. The Tenth Circuit could have exempted the FWS
from undertaking the NEPA process before designating critical habitat, and
it could have done so without following other courts blindly. Instead, the
Tenth Circuit need only have looked to its own precedent. To use the Tenth
Circuit's own language: to require the FWS, "an organization... whose
regulatory activities are necessarily concerned with environmental
consequences... [to] stop in the middle of its proceedings in order to issue
a separate and distinct impact statement just to be issuing it... would
decrease environmental protection activity rather than increase it."374 The

374. Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66,71-72 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906
(1976).
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379

Tenth Circuit's failure even to consider functional equivalence in Catron
County, notwithstanding the fact that the FWS raised it only in passing,
arguably led to an incorrect decision. Although the issue is apparently
decided in the Tenth Circuit, courts in other circuits, facing the question of
whether the FWS must comply with NEPA before designating critical
habitat for threatened or endangered species, should scrutinize the
administrative records the FWS produces, should evaluate the similarities
between NEPA's and the ESA's procedures, and should consider granting
exemptions based on functional equivalence.
KURT J. VAN DEREN

